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Abstract 
This thesis consists of three parts. Part one responds to an argument by Jason Baehr 
that virtues of intellectual character which make their possessor good qua person can also 
figure as virtues in reliabilist accounts of knowledge. I analyze his argument with special 
attention to the cases he uses to motivate his claims, and argue that the role which intellectual 
character virtues play in the acquisition of knowledge is not the role which is relevant to 
reliabilists accounts of knowledge. More generally, I argue that character intellectual virtues 
are not good candidates for reliabilist virtues because their telos is not simply aimed at 
achieving warranted true beliefs. The second part of this thesis addresses an interpretive 
puzzle in Plato’s Theaetetus. In a short passage, Plato seems to deviate from arguing against a 
Protagorean account of knowledge and has Socrates deliver a description of two rival ways of 
life that turns into an exhortation to practice justice. The passage contrasts men shaped by life 
in the courts with those shaped by philosophy. This “digression” raises questions both about 
its relationship to the surrounding attempts to analyze knowledge and about the relationship 
between the detached philosophers portrayed in the digression and Socrates. I argue the 
digression serves to reveal the implications of the Protagorean account of knowledge for 
evaluating who has true wisdom about life, and that the philosophers portrayed in the 
digression are sufficiently and relevantly like Socrates that the digression also serves to 
advocate a Socratic lifestyle against a Protagorean lifestyle. The third part of this thesis 
analyzes and criticizes Thomas Scanlon’s account of moral motivation as fundamentally 
consisting in the reasons we have to live life in a relation of “mutual recognition” with other 
people. I argue that the reasons to live in such a relation to others cannot account for the full 
rational force of morality, and, more particularly, that they cannot explain what is 
distinctively wrong with someone not concerned with morality. I conclude by noting ways in 
which Scanlon’s account could be improved by explaining moral motivation in terms of the 
value of persons. 
 
 
  
iii 
 
Table of Contents 
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 
1. Can Character Intellectual Virtues Be Reliabilist Virtues? ........................... 3 
1.1. Introduction ................................................................................................. 4 
1.2. Characterizing Virtues of Intellectual Character as Opposed to 
Cognitive Faculties Etc. ........................................................................................................ 6 
1.3. Characterizing Virtue Reliabilism ............................................................. 9 
1.4. Baehr’s Argument that Intellectual Virtues Can Be Reliabilist Virtues . 
  ..................................................................................................................... 12 
1.5. My Response to the First Two Cases: Is This the Right Sort of Best 
Explanation?  ..................................................................................................................... 15 
1.6. Baehr’s Third Case and Some Complications for My Response to 
Baehr  ..................................................................................................................... 23 
1.7. Conclusion: A Difference in Telos ........................................................... 31 
2. Knowledge, Ethics, and Socrates: Two Questions about the Digression in 
the Theaetetus ......................................................................................................................... 34 
2.1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 35 
2.2. The Digression and Epistemology ............................................................ 41 
2.2.1. The Socratic Quest for Wisdom ............................................................... 41 
iv 
 
2.2.2. “Wise” Versus “Wise About X” .............................................................. 42 
2.2.3. Ability and Wisdom for Socrates and Protagoras .................................... 44 
2.2.4. The Digression as an Elaboration of Protagoreanism about Wisdom ..... 47 
2.2.5. The Digression as an Argument against Protagoreanism about Wisdom 48 
2.2.6. Interim Conclusion: A Relevant Digression ............................................ 51 
2.3. The Digression and Socrates .................................................................... 51 
2.3.1. Introduction .............................................................................................. 51 
2.3.2. Denials that the Digression is Socratic .................................................... 52 
2.3.3. The Shift in Emphasis in the Digression and its Socratic Conclusion ... 
  ........................................................................................................... 53 
2.3.4. Socrates’ Affinities with the Philosophers ............................................... 57 
2.4. Conclusion .................................................................................................. 59 
3. Why Care about what We Owe Others? A Critique of Scanlon’s Account of 
Moral Motivation .................................................................................................................... 61 
3.1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 62 
3.2. Priority, Importance, and Prichard’s Dilemma ..................................... 65 
3.3. Scanlon’s Account: An Overview ............................................................ 67 
3.4. The Value of Persons versus the Value of Mutual Recognition ............ 74 
v 
 
3.5. Impersonal Values ..................................................................................... 76 
3.6. Criticism: Wrong Account of Priority .................................................... 79 
3.6.1. Two Worries ............................................................................................ 79 
3.6.2. Limitations of the Value of Mutual Recognition ..................................... 79 
3.6.3. Priority and the Limited Domain of Contractualism ............................... 84 
3.7. Criticism: Wrong Account of Importance .............................................. 85 
3.8. Conclusion: ................................................................................................ 88 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 91 
References ................................................................................................................... 94 
Vita ............................................................................................................................... 97 
 
1 
 
Introduction 
These three essays are divergent, yet each in its own way concerns the relationship 
between virtue and other goods, where virtue is understood as being good qua person. 
Specifically, part one explores reasons why such virtues are ill-suited for employment in 
analyses of knowledge which understand knowledge as warranted true belief in propositions. I 
highlight the difference in telos between being a good person with regard to intellectual 
conduct and knowing that a given proposition is true. Part two examines the correlation 
between a particular (mis)conception of knowledge and a non-virtuous life in Plato’s 
Theaetetus. This offers a different kind of connection between knowledge and character than 
the connection sought by virtue reliabilists. The connection runs through wisdom, since it is 
both a species of knowledge and intimately connected to character. Part three argues that 
Thomas Scanlon’s account of moral obligation is insufficiently sensitive to other values since 
he attempts to explain moral obligation strictly in terms of our reasons to be in a certain 
relationship to others. This forces him to cut off moral obligation from other values. 
Part one responds to an argument by Jason Baehr that virtues of intellectual character 
which make their possessor good qua person can also figure as virtues in reliabilist accounts 
of knowledge. I analyze his argument with special attention to the cases he uses to motivate 
his claims, and argue that the role which intellectual character virtues play in the acquisition 
of knowledge is not the role which is relevant to reliabilists accounts of knowledge. More 
generally, I argue that character intellectual virtues are not good candidates for reliabilist 
virtues because their telos is not simply aimed at achieving warranted true beliefs.  
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The second part of this thesis addresses an interpretive puzzle in Plato’s Theaetetus. In 
a short passage, Plato seems to deviate from arguing against a Protagorean account of 
knowledge and has Socrates deliver a description of two rival ways of life that turns into an 
exhortation to practice justice. The passage contrasts men shaped by life in the courts with 
those shaped philosophy. This “digression” raises questions both about its relationship to the 
surrounding attempts to analyze knowledge and about the relationship between the detached 
philosophers portrayed in the digression and Socrates. I argue the digression serves to reveal 
the implications of the Protagorean account of knowledge for evaluating who has true wisdom 
about life, and that the philosophers portrayed in the digression are sufficiently and relevantly 
like Socrates that the digression also serves to advocate a Socratic lifestyle against a 
Protagorean lifestyle.  
The third part of this thesis analyzes and criticizes Thomas Scanlon’s account of moral 
motivation as fundamentally consisting in the reasons we have to live life in a relation of 
“mutual recognition” with other people. I argue that the reasons to live in such a relation to 
others cannot account for the full rational force of morality, and, more particularly, that they 
cannot explain what is distinctively wrong with someone not concerned with morality. I 
conclude by noting ways in which Scanlon’s account could be improved by explaining moral 
motivation in terms of the value of persons. 
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1. Can Character Intellectual Virtues Be Reliabilist Virtues? 
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ABSTRACT: I respond to an argument by Jason Baehr that virtues of intellectual character 
which make their possessor good qua person can also figure as virtues in reliabilist accounts 
of knowledge. I analyze his argument with special attention to the cases he uses to motivate 
his claims, and argue that the role which intellectual character virtues play in the acquisition 
of knowledge is not the role which is relevant to reliabilists accounts of knowledge. More 
generally, I argue that character intellectual virtues are not good candidates for reliabilist 
virtues because their telos is not simply aimed at achieving warranted true beliefs. 
 
1.1. Introduction 
In this paper I challenge Jason Baehr’s argument that reliabilist accounts of knowledge 
need, on their own terms, to include some intellectual character virtues within their inventory 
of reliable knowledge-makers.1 Virtue reliabilists hold roughly that an agent’s true belief 
about X amounts to knowledge if and only if his reaching the truth about X is attributable or 
creditable to the exercise of some suitable virtue of his. A reliabilist virtue is a cognitive 
excellence or ability of an agent. While I am not aware of any attempt to give an exhaustive 
list of suitable reliabilist virtues, virtue reliabilists generally have in mind our basic cognitive 
faculties. But Baehr argues that this category should include virtues of intellectual character 
as well, since they also can explain, and sometimes are the best explanation for, why an agent 
reaches the truth about a matter. One of my chief contentions is that we need to distinguish 
between various ways in which a virtue might explain why someone reaches the truth, for not 
all such explanations are of the sort appropriate for virtue reliabilism. 
Baehr is not concerned to defend reliabilism, or more specifically, virtue reliabilism. 
Rather, he argues that excellences of intellectual character sometimes play the same epistemic 
                                                 
1 Jason S. Baehr, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology (Oxford 
University Press, 2011) The argument is found in chapter 4, but I will draw on other parts of the book as well. 
5 
 
role as the epistemic faculties, with which virtue reliabilists generally concern themselves.2 
He argues that for this reason virtue reliabilist accounts of propositional knowledge need to 
include as reliabilist virtues, not only cognitive faculties, but also virtues of intellectual 
character. In the same way, I am not concerned to evaluate virtue reliabilist accounts of 
propositional knowledge, but rather to evaluate Baehr’s argument that such accounts should, 
on their own terms, include character intellectual virtues in their analysis and explanation of 
propositional knowledge. 
In section I, I clarify the kind of virtues under discussion. Section II provides a more 
detailed characterization of virtue reliabilism and a discussion of what precisely Baehr thinks 
the role of character intellectual virtues should be in such accounts of knowledge. Section III 
presents (most of) his argument for why virtues of intellectual character should play that role 
in virtue reliabilist accounts. In section IV, I argue that the first two, at least, of Baehr’s case 
studies fail to support his conclusion because he does not adequately take into account the 
various sorts of ways in which intellectual virtues can explain why someone reaches the truth. 
In section V, I consider the complication, raised by Baehr’s third case study and one that he 
capitalizes on, that the exercise of virtues of intellectual character is often constituted, in large 
part, by the use of cognitive faculties. I give various reasons for thinking that even then it is 
the exercise of the cognitive faculties, rather than the virtuous character which they constitute, 
that does the explanatory work relevant to reliabilism. I conclude in section VI with a 
discussion of how the telos of virtues of intellectual character is fundamentally different from 
                                                 
2 In fact, in chapter 5 of the same book he gives a corresponding argument that evidentialist theories 
need to take account of intellectual virtues. Ibid. 
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that of the virtues that could serve as reliabilist knowledge-makers, and how this makes it 
unlikely that the former can serve as reliabilist virtues. 
1.2. Characterizing Virtues of Intellectual Character as Opposed to Cognitive 
Faculties Etc. 
First, a note on the virtue terminology used in this paper: Intellectual virtues refer to 
any trait that is an intellectual or epistemic excellence of the person, whether a character trait 
like open-mindedness or a cognitive faculty like the visual system. Character intellectual 
virtues refer to intellectual virtues that are virtuous character traits. I may simply refer to them 
as character virtues when it is not important to emphasize that, or when it is contextually 
obvious that, they are intellectual. Faculty intellectual virtues refer to cognitive faculties such 
as eyesight, hearing, the capacity for basic logical inferences etc. I may simply refer to them 
as faculty virtues when it is not important to emphasize that, or when it is contextually 
obvious that, they are intellectual. Reliabilist virtues refer to traits or qualities that, according 
to virtue reliabilist accounts of knowledge, can explain why true beliefs are knowledge. In 
summary, virtue reliabilists think that true beliefs qualify as knowledge in virtue of being 
appropriately explained or caused by reliabilist virtues. Faculty virtues are standardly 
considered reliabilist virtues. Baehr’s contention is that character intellectual virtues 
sometimes are reliabilist virtues as well. 
So then, the first task is to clarify what Baehr means by intellectual character virtues 
and by cognitive faculties. Baehr gives an initial characterization in chapter 2. His list of 
character intellectual virtues includes the likes of inquisitiveness, attentiveness, fair-
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mindedness, intellectual integrity, creativity, and perseverance.3 He points out three main 
differences between these virtues and the cognitive faculties or faculty epistemic virtues like 
memory, the senses, introspection, and the ability to make basic logical inferences. First, 
intellectual virtues are cultivated traits, whereas excellent faculties are innate. Second, he 
argues that, unlike cognitive faculties, intellectual virtues bear on “personal worth”. For, to 
attribute intellectual virtue to an agent “is to suggest that she is, albeit in a certain distinctively 
intellectual way or capacity, a good person or good qua person.”4 Third and finally, 
intellectual virtues characteristically require agency in their exercise, but cognitive faculties 
do not. However, Baehr softens this distinction somewhat by noting that character and faculty 
excellences often depend on each other for realization, since exercising intellectual virtues 
often involves making excellent use of faculties.5  
These virtues are strikingly similar to moral virtues, and in many ways they look more 
like moral virtues than they look like our basic cognitive faculties.6 Moral and intellectual 
character virtues both involve goodness qua person, cultivation, and agency. And both types 
of virtues are traits that we are responsible for in a deeper way than endowments like 
cognitive faculties and other natural capacities.  
                                                 
3 Ibid., 21. 
4 Ibid., 23. 
5 Ibid., 24–25. 
6 Baehr includes an appendix on the relationship of moral and intellectual character virtues. He takes 
other-regardingness to be the distinguishing feature of moral virtues and argues in A.5 that intellectual virtues 
sometimes but not always are other-regarding and so sometimes but not always are also moral virtues (218-220). 
I am not sold on this way of delineating moral virtues, but that does not matter for this paper. 
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The most significant of the differences Baehr lists between cognitive faculties and 
intellectual virtues seems to be that the latter bear on personal worth and so make one good 
qua person. This is what makes them character virtues. On the other hand, the mere fact that 
an excellence is cultivated does not make it a character virtue. Nor, it seems, does the fact that 
an excellence requires agency in its exercise. The ability to read a foreign language is heavily 
cultivated and, until one acquires a high degree of proficiency, requires significant exercise of 
agency. Yet it groups more closely with faculty virtues like eyesight than with traits like 
perseverance and intellectual curiosity, though these last may contribute to acquisition of the 
language.  Baehr distinguishes skills from intellectual virtues because, although deliberately 
cultivated, they do not in themselves make one better as a person. Further, unlike virtues, their 
exercise need not come from an admirable motivation.7 Cognitive faculties and skills can be 
used well, but in themselves they don’t make the agent a better person.  
It is important to examine Baehr’s characterization of these virtues for the sake of 
noting how different they are from cognitive faculties, which are what virtue reliabilists 
usually class as intellectual virtues.  It should be clear already that what we are concerned 
with are virtues in the full ethical sense—even though Baehr does not think they are 
necessarily “moral.” The distinction Baehr makes between intellectual temperaments and 
intellectual virtues makes this even clearer. Baehr describes intellectual temperaments as 
“‘natural’ psychological dispositions” which are “dispositions to manifest certain attitudes, 
feelings, judgments, and the like.” Thus intellectual temperaments function much like 
                                                 
7 Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 30. 
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intellectual virtues and, as he notes, can be described in virtue language.8 Baehr argues that 
they do not qualify as virtues because they do not bear on personal worth, and they don’t 
require rational understanding of why and how the actions that flow from them are good.  
He connects both of these differences to the fact that temperaments are natural in a 
way that character virtues are not. As merely natural, whether innate or passively absorbed 
from one’s upbringing, temperaments do not demonstrate one’s worth or goodness as a person 
and as an agent. And as merely natural it can be received or adopted unreflectively without 
thinking of its point, or even whether it is good or bad.9 So it is intellectual virtues in this 
robust sense, which go beyond, not only cognitive faculties, but also cultivated skills and even 
natural temperaments, which Baehr argues can be reliabilist virtues.  Thus, he is arguing that 
full character intellectual virtues, and not merely things that have a lot in common with 
character virtues, should be included by reliabilist theories as suitable ways of reaching the 
truth, and thus that reliabilists should be willing to label beliefs knowledge, not only on the 
basis of the truth being reached by the exercise of excellent cognitive faculties, but also on the 
basis of the truth being reached by exercising character intellectual virtues. 
 
1.3. Characterizing Virtue Reliabilism 
Baehr engages almost exclusively with virtue reliabilism in particular, but he intends 
his main claims to “apply equally to any other variety of reliabilism.”10 He mainly discusses 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 26–27. 
9 Ibid., 27–28. 
10 Ibid., 48. 
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“credit theories” and “attribution theories.” These theories claim that for a true belief to be 
knowledge the fact that the agent believes truly about the matter in question must be 
creditable or attributable to the agent, and thus that if we can’t attribute or credit the fact that 
he believes truly rather than falsely to the agent, then the belief falls short of knowledge. 
However, he thinks that the central arguments apply to reliabilist theories in general, even to 
those theories which see the source of epistemic justification in the “reliable process or 
method” by which it is produced rather than in qualities of the agent. For, forming beliefs 
through exercises of intellectual virtue involves “instantiating certain reliable processes or 
employing certain reliable methods.” 11,12  
Baehr is not concerned with elaborating a reliabilist theory of epistemic desiderata like 
knowledge, justification or warrant, but rather with making the claim that any such theory 
needs to make room for character virtues within its inventory of reliable processes or virtues. 
But looking at a rough and ready reliabilist account of justification that incorporates some of 
Baehr’s preferred language, will help explicate what exactly Baehr is concerned with. So 
consider RRR (Rough and Ready Reliabilism):  
A subject (S) knows her true belief B about a subject matter M if and only if S’s 
“reaching the truth and avoiding error”13 about M is best explained by some x which 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 56. 
12 What is the relationship between virtues (whether cognitive faculties or the intellectual virtues Baehr 
wants to include) and processes? It seems to me that reliabilist theories put in terms of virtues or faculties will 
still involve processes, specifically the excellent functioning of faculties or the virtuous forming of beliefs. 
Surely, those theories don’t think that the mere fact that a belief results from a reliable faculty confers positive 
status on it even if the faculty malfunctions in that particular case. If I have excellent eyesight, but on very rare 
occasions my optic system misroutes a crucial electrical impulse to the wrong part of my brain, those beliefs 
don’t have positive status, for my excellent faculty used a process that did not constitute functioning excellently. 
What is distinctive then about virtue reliabilism, is that it limits what reliable processes can confer positive 
status, not that it does not require reliable processes. 
13 Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 52. 
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“plays a critical or salient role in getting [her] to the truth”14 about SM, where x is a 
member of class C. 
RRR, of course, leaves us with the work of specifying the contents of class C. What 
Baehr is concerned to argue is that class C must include intellectual virtues if reliabilism is 
going to give an adequate account of knowledge. Note that this is not to claim that reliabilist 
accounts should make intellectual virtues a requisite for knowledge, but rather that intellectual 
virtues are one of the items that can be responsible for why S gets to the truth about some 
particular subject matter, and responsible in the particular way that reliabilists think renders B 
knowledge. 
Perhaps this last contrast will be clearer if we clarify the relationship between this 
analysis of knowledge and explanations of why someone gets to the truth about a specific 
subject matter. One central idea behind reliabilism is that the etiology of a belief matters. 
Whether the focus is on the reliability of the process that generates the belief or on the virtues 
(excellences) of the subject that are responsible for the belief, reliabilist accounts tend to 
define knowledge in part by defining what counts as a suitable etiology. The etiology of a 
belief, or rather certain features of the etiology, is supposed to be what explains why it is 
knowledge. I know that the fence in my front yard is still standing because I see it, which is to 
say that the good functioning of my visual system explains the belief and the belief’s etiology 
in my visual system renders it knowledge. Of course other etiologies could also produce 
knowledge. I could walk around the fence blindfolded, touching it with my hands. Reliabilism 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
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stresses that etiologies that can render something knowledge must be reliable. Virtue 
reliabilism stresses that suitable etiologies must involve virtues of the agents. What Baehr 
argues is that no reliabilist analysis that excludes intellectual virtues as a legitimate 
knowledge-conferring etiology could be adequate as an analysis of knowledge. For, he argues, 
in some cases of knowledge it is intellectual virtues, rather than faculty virtues or other 
reliabilist candidates, which do the crucial explanatory work in explaining why someone 
reached the truth about the subject matter.15 But now, on to Baehr’s argument. 
1.4. Baehr’s Argument that Intellectual Virtues Can Be Reliabilist Virtues 
Baehr first notes that the formal definition of reliabilist virtues need not exclude 
character intellectual virtues. For they could well qualify as “personal qualities that, under 
certain conditions and with respect to certain propositions, are a reliable means to reaching the 
truth and avoiding error.” And in some situations “reaching the truth” is in fact “explained 
largely or most saliently in terms of an exercise of certain traits of intellectual character.”  
Thus if we are going to explain knowledge as arising from exercises of intellectual virtue, we 
must admit that sometimes the relevant intellectual virtue is a character intellectual virtue.16 
Two clarifications are in order here. First, Baehr is very explicit that he does not think 
all knowledge requires character intellectual virtues, but only that in some cases of knowledge 
the relevant intellectual virtue will be a character virtue rather than a faculty virtue. Second, 
                                                 
15 While Baehr is not committed to a reliabilist analysis of knowledge, he seems to accept the idea that 
virtues can explain why someone reached the truth about a subject. Thus he can endorse an argument like this: 
Intellectual virtues sometimes explain (critically and saliently) why an agent reaches the truth about a subject. 
Therefore if you are going to analyze knowledge as true beliefs reached because of reliabilist virtues, you need to 
allow intellectual virtues as reliabilist virtues. 
16 Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 52. 
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Baehr is not simply arguing that these virtues are needed for a complete explanation of why 
the subject reaches the truth in such cases. Rather, he is arguing that in some cases character 
virtues, rather than the faculty virtues involved (and thus also needed for a complete 
explanation), are what best explain why we get to the truth.17 
In the second stage of the argument, Baehr puts forward and analyzes three cases in 
order to support the claim that agency virtues actually do sometimes play the kind of 
explanatory role which he claims that they do.  I will consider his interpretation of the first 
two cases and offer my response, before coming back to the third case and his treatment of it, 
which will pose some complications for my response. Here are the first two cases:  
CASE 1 A field biologist is trying to explain a change in the migration patterns 
of a certain endangered bird species. Collecting and analyzing the relevant data is 
tedious work and requires a special eye for detail. The biologist is committed to 
discovering the truth and so spends long hours in the field gathering data. He remains 
focused and determined in the face of various obstacles and distractions (e.g. 
conflicting evidence, bureaucratic road blocks, inclement weather, boredom, etc.). He 
picks up on important details in environmental reports and makes keen discriminations 
regarding the composition and trajectory of several observed flocks. As a result of his 
                                                 
17 Here is a key passage from Baehr:  “While reaching the truth in these areas does typically require that 
our cognitive faculties be in good working order, this is not usually what explains or at least best explains our 
actually getting to the truth. Rather, reaching the truth in these areas is often explained largely or most saliently 
in terms of an exercise of certain traits of intellectual character: traits like intellectual carefulness, thoroughness, 
tenacity, adaptability, creativity, circumspection, attentiveness, patience, and honesty” (p. 53 emphasis in 
original) 
14 
 
determination and careful and insightful methods of inquiry, he discovers why the 
birds have altered their course.18  
CASE 2 An investigative reporter is researching a story on corporate crime and 
begins to uncover evidence indicating that some of the perpetrators are executives in 
the very corporation that owns his newspaper. The reporter believes that he and his 
readership have a right to know about the crimes, so he persists with the investigation, 
recognizing that it may cost him his job, and perhaps more. Undaunted even by 
personal threats, the reporter proceeds with his investigation. After several months of 
rigorous intellectual labor, he uncovers and exposes the executives' misdeeds.19 
Baehr takes these examples to show that the explanatory work for why the agent 
knows is done, not by faculty virtues, but by character virtues. The agents “reach the truth 
because they exhibit certain attitudes or character traits. These traits seem to account most 
saliently for or to best explain why the individuals form true beliefs.” Baehr supports this 
claim about the greater explanatory salience of character intellectual virtues with the claim 
that the agents in question do not reach the truth “simply or even primarily” because of having 
or exercising good eyesight or memory, or because of “making valid logical inferences.”20 
Baehr concludes that, since these kinds of cases impose requirements on the agent beyond 
“the routine operation of a person’s basic cognitive endowment,” and since such cases often 
concern beliefs about important matters, virtue reliabilists “are unable to adequately account 
                                                 
18 Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 53–54. 
19 Ibid., 54. 
20 Ibid. 
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for some of the most important items of knowledge” because they dismiss intellectual 
character virtues (emphasis mine).21 
1.5. My Response to the First Two Cases: Is This the Right Sort of Best 
Explanation? 
Certainly these cases illustrate the importance of intellectual character. They also 
show that character intellectual virtues can be salient explanations of why an agent reaches 
the truth about something. But what I want to cast doubt on in this section is the idea that they 
provide explanations of the right sort for the reliabilist project, and thus on the idea that they 
are salient in the sense in which they need to be salient in order for Baehr’s argument to work. 
For this purpose, I can even grant Baehr’s stronger claim that traits of intellectual character 
sometimes most saliently or best explain why someone reaches the truth. For my contention is 
that identifying a trait as a reliabilist virtue, or “reliabilist knowledge-maker,” is not simply a 
matter of determining that in an overall sense it best explains why someone reaches the truth, 
but rather that it gives the right sort of explanation of why he reaches the truth. Questions of 
what constitutes the best or primary explanation of something overall are quite complicated 
and beyond what I can deal with in this paper. Rather, what I will do in this section is pursue 
several different lines of reasoning that indicate that the explanation provided by intellectual 
character virtues in Baehr’s first two cases is not the kind of explanation relevant to the 
reliabilist account of  knowledge. 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 55. 
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Virtue epistemologist Ernest Sosa notes a problem with relying on the criterion of 
greatest explanatory salience. He takes knowledge to be a species of success “creditable to an 
agent.” Success in reaching the truth is creditable to the agent when it “is due to an aptitude 
(to a competence or skill or virtue) seated in the agent, whose exercise is rewarded with 
success.” He notes that “one promising proposal” for understanding how a true belief may be 
due to a virtue or aptitude of the agent is that the explanation for success in reaching the truth 
“must saliently involve that aptitude.” However, he points out a problem with this proposal. In 
some circumstances, what is most salient as an explanation is not the aptitude (virtue) from 
which the agent acts, but rather the fact that the agent’s aptitude was not compromised, or that 
he was in suitable circumstances for the successful exercise of his intellectual virtue. Thus if 
an evil demon is systematically messing with the conditions or messing with the agent’s 
abilities, the fact that he spared one exercise of virtue may be the most salient explanation for 
why the agent succeeded in reaching the truth. But this does not, says Sosa, take away from 
the fact that the agent’s success is due to his virtue.22 Thus, returning to Baehr’s cases, the 
mere fact that character intellectual virtues most saliently explain why an agent reaches the 
truth does not mean that they provide the right sort of explanation for reliabilist accounts of 
knowledge.23 
                                                 
22 Ernest Sosa, A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 86–87. 
23 This response to Baehr might not be available to John Greco who in Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-
Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity, Kindle (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), 73ff attempts to 
explain when an agent’s true belief is from ability and when it is not, by discussing under what conditions 
believing from ability is the most salient cause of her believing truly. 
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One of the first things to note about these cases is that the virtues involved seem to 
explain why the agent obtained specific beliefs about the subject at all rather than why he 
obtained true as opposed to false beliefs. If our scientist was less virtuous he simply wouldn’t 
have findings. If the reporter backed off of the story he wouldn’t have anything to say about 
that story. While they might have had some false beliefs if they had not gotten to the truth of 
the matter, these would likely have been broad and vague and uncertain, and they might well 
have simply not formed beliefs about the matter. The true beliefs are because of intellectual 
virtues, but it does not seem like the right kind of ‘because’ for reliabilist theories. Causes 
affect one’s reaching the truth in various ways, and it is not clear that character intellectual 
virtues are the cause of the truth of the beliefs which is relevant for an account of knowledge. 
We can draw the distinction among virtues differently than Baehr does in order to 
bring out why we should not regard a quality as a reliabilist knowledge maker simply because 
it most saliently explains why one reaches the truth about something. While he distinguishes 
between faculty intellectual virtues and character intellectual virtues, we can also distinguish 
between virtues or excellences that simply bear on epistemic conduct and virtues or 
excellences that are epistemic in a more specific sense. The former are about being good as a 
human being, and thus they are oriented toward good human acting and they also carry 
implications for epistemic conduct. Thus they include Baehr’s character intellectual virtues 
since those bear on personal worth, but also could include most moral virtues. The latter, 
narrowly epistemic virtues are about being able to know things. Since propositional 
knowledge is what is primarily in question, this means that these virtues are mainly oriented 
18 
 
toward obtaining warrant for beliefs. This group includes, among other things, Baehr’s faculty 
intellectual virtues as well as what he classes as skills or talents.24 Thus this distinction does, 
at least for the most part, separate the intellectual virtues in the same way as the character 
versus faculty division among epistemic virtues, it does so on a different basis and covers a 
wider class of virtues.    
Cases where the course of action that would facilitate knowledge is morally wrong 
show vividly how these two kinds of virtues differ. EJ Coffman makes this point with an 
example where I could gain knowledge about my neighbor’s actions by spying on him in a 
morally unacceptable way.25 Clearly this would be an excellent action in terms of virtues that 
are narrowly epistemic and oriented simply at obtaining knowledge (of any and every possible 
object of knowledge). But it is also clear that a good human being must regulate his 
employment of such virtues by standards of virtuous character. Even in cases that don’t 
involve any conflict between excellent character and narrowly epistemic excellence, the 
distinction is generally clear enough. We can distinguish what the virtue is oriented toward 
and thus what its telos is (I will discuss the difference in telos more extensively in the 
conclusion). Further, we can even make this distinction when excellence as a human being not 
only does not conflict with our coming to know some proposition but positively facilitates 
it—that is with regard to the very cases that Baehr cites to show that character intellectual 
virtues can explain knowledge.  
                                                 
24 For a discussion of these see Baehr, The Inquiring Mind ch. 2. What he calls intellectual 
temperaments would also fit in this category if they qualify as being virtues. 
25 E.J. Coffman. Virtue Epistemology Seminar. Fall 2012. University of Tennessee. 
19 
 
One way to get at this distinction is to distinguish between internal and external 
barriers to knowing. Consider excellent basketball playing as an analogy. The virtues 
necessary to overcome barriers external to basketball don’t factor the same way as virtues 
necessary to overcome internal challenges to excellent performance when it comes to 
evaluating one’s excellence as a basketball player. The ability to consistently make shots is 
relevant to that assessment in a way that the ability to discipline oneself to maintain regular 
practice times is not. Nor are the character traits out of which one decides whether and how 
much to pursue excellence in basketball relevant for assessing one’s skill as a basketball 
player. Similarly, it may be that the agency virtues were involved in overcoming external 
obstacles to getting to the truth about migratory patterns or the corporate crimes, but did not 
explain the success in meeting the internal challenges to finding the truth.  
The basketball analogue to an item of knowledge, on a virtue reliabilist account, is a 
particular play which is successfully executed from skill rather than luck. In either case the 
character, whether good or ill, that got one to pursue inquiry or to pursue skillful playing 
seems irrelevant to the assessment at hand. Thus the fact that courage was causally necessary 
in order for the reporter to obtain true beliefs need not mean that the courage is an epistemic 
virtue in the narrow sense, any more than a basketball player’s need for courage in order to 
make it to the field makes courage a basketball virtue. So it is far from clear that Baehr’s first 
two cases show us that virtues of intellectual character, are reliabilist knowledge-makers. 
Another way to approach the question of whether the character intellectual virtues in 
Baehr’s cases provide the sort of explanation required for reliabilist accounts of knowledge is 
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to compare intellectual virtues with epistemic luck. One significant motivation for the 
emphasis on the etiology of beliefs in virtue reliabilism is the concern that luck in the 
formation of a true belief can mean that that true belief does not amount to knowledge. Thus 
there is a rough symmetry between epistemic luck and intellectual virtues: luck in the etiology 
of a true belief often undercuts its status as knowledge while virtue reliabilists hope to show 
that intellectual virtues in a true belief’s etiology can underwrite its status as knowledge.  But 
not all luck in a belief’s etiology undercuts knowledge, and the symmetry with intellectual 
virtues extends here as well, for neither does all intellectual virtue that factors in a true 
belief’s etiology underwrite knowledge. So it is important to get as clear as we can on how 
and in what way epistemic luck or intellectual virtue must factor into a true belief’s etiology if 
it is to plausibly undercut or underwrite its status as knowledge.26  
Mylan Engel has pointed out the crucial distinction between veritic luck, where the 
truth of one’s belief is lucky given one’s epistemic situation, and evidential luck where one is 
lucky to be in the epistemic situation in which one is.27 Engel offers as a paradigm case of 
veritic luck a card player who believes truly that the jack of hearts is the top card of a freshly 
shuffled deck even though he has no good reason whatsoever to think the probability higher 
than random. His belief is true from luck and is clearly not knowledge.28 Engel’s paradigm 
case of evidential luck involves a novelist who decides on a whim to work in her study rather 
                                                 
26 Baehr would of course agree with these last two sentences. What I am arguing against is his 
assumption that the way we judge whether a virtue does the relevant epistemic work is by considering its overall 
explanatory salience in the agent’s reaching of the truth. 
27 Mylan Engel, “Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge?,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 30, 
no. 2 (1992): 67. 
28 Ibid., 68. 
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than in the bowels of the library. Thus she is luckily in a position to observe and form true 
beliefs about an afternoon thunderstorm. Clearly this luck does not undermine her knowledge 
about the storm.29 In a similar fashion we can think of some intellectual virtues, or exercises 
of virtues, as explaining why we have the evidence that we do, or if we are worried about 
putting it only in terms of evidence, as explaining why we are in the epistemic position more 
generally that we are in. But other intellectual virtues or exercises thereof can explain why a 
belief is not lucky given one’s epistemic situation. Many of my perceptual beliefs are not 
veritically lucky precisely because they are formed by appropriate cognitive faculties 
functioning well.30 
One way to put the question for Baehr’s thesis, then, is whether character intellectual 
virtues explain why the agent is not veritically lucky or simply explain why he is not 
evidentially lucky or, more generally, not lucky to be in his good epistemic situation. Since 
evidential luck is not (generally at least) a threat to propositional knowledge, explaining why 
someone is not evidentially lucky in regard to some proposition he knows does not 
necessarily explain why he knows it; rather it would be whatever explains why he is not 
veritically lucky with regard to the belief that could explain why he knows it. The character of 
Baehr’s biologist and reporter seem to enable them to be in the right epistemic situation to 
acquire knowledge while their cognitive faculties explain why they can take advantage of the 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 69. 
30 Note that one need not go in for a virtue reliabilist account of knowledge in order to accept this more 
limited claim. 
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situation—why their believing truly is not lucky relative to their evidential situation (or 
epistemic situation in some broader sense). 
It is worth noting that some kinds of evidential luck can undermine other positive 
epistemic evaluations. If I pop off the correct answer to five obscure questions about Chinese 
history, you might conclude that I must be an expert on Chinese history. However if I only 
knew them because one of my friends recited five random facts of Chinese history to me an 
hour before, and thus I was lucky to have the evidence for those beliefs, this would undermine 
my claim to expertise. It would not however undermine my claim to know the propositions 
with which I answered.  Similarly, if the biologist or reporter had simply stumbled upon 
compelling evidence rather than tenaciously and thoughtfully gathering it, this would not 
undermine their claim to know their conclusions, but it might undermine other positive 
epistemic evaluations of their expertise or competence.31 
Engel’s distinction between veritic and evidential luck shows that we need to think 
carefully about the various ways in which luck affects our knowledge and distinguish those 
that undermine it from those that do not. The various considerations I have advanced in this 
section are all intended to do the same with regard to virtues. I hope to have shown at the least 
that we need to pay careful attention to the various ways that intellectual virtues can cause us 
to reach the truth about something or explain why we know something. And I hope to have 
shown that virtues of intellectual character do not obviously provide the kind of explanation 
that virtue reliabilists are interested in, even in the cases that Baehr presents. But, as I discuss 
                                                 
31 If for no other reason than that they would not have as much context for why their conclusions are 
correct and what the problems are with rival explanations. 
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next, Baehr’s third case is more promising for supporting his thesis than the first two which I 
quoted earlier. 
1.6. Baehr’s Third Case and Some Complications for My Response to Baehr 
Baehr’s third case creates some complications for the line of response I have been 
developing. For while I have brought up various reasons to think that character virtues give a 
different kind of explanation for why an agent reaches the truth than the kind which virtue 
reliabilists are (or should be) interested in, his third case is designed to show that agency 
virtues are often very tightly connected with the faculty virtues, which they are 
paradigmatically interested in. This tight connection makes it harder to see why agency 
virtues are not doing the right kind of explanatory work for reliabilist accounts. 
CASE 3. An historian has garnered international recognition and praise for a book in 
which she defends a certain view of how the religious faith of one of America's 
"founding fathers" influenced his politics. While researching her next book, the 
historian runs across some heretofore unexamined personal letters of this figure that 
blatantly contradict her own account of his theology and its effects on his political 
thought and behavior. She does not ignore or suppress the letters, but rather examines 
them fairly and thoroughly. Because she is more interested in believing and writing 
what is true than she is in receiving the praise of her colleagues and readers, she 
accepts the implications of this new data for her previously published work, and 
proceeds to repudiate the relevant parts of it, both privately and in print.32 
 
In this case character intellectual virtues do lead one to replace false beliefs with true 
ones.  As Baehr notes, there is more to the influence of character intellectual virtues than 
simply motivating one to keep researching. These virtues: “might also lead her to think 
                                                 
32 Baehr, The Inquiring Mind, 54. 
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through the data in reasonable (rather than sloppy and defensive) ways or to draw valid 
conclusions from it (rather than to distort its implications).” So open-mindedness “might 
cause [the historian] to avoid committing a certain logical fallacy that most others in her 
situation would commit, or to perceive an otherwise easily missed logical connection.” Thus 
reasoning and character virtues are tightly connected. For, “It is not as though she displays 
open-mindedness and subsequently reasons in the ways in question. Rather, her exercise of 
open-mindedness is partly constituted by her acts of reasoning.”33 
But need this tight connection between open-mindedness and cognitive faculties 
indicate that the truth of the historian’s belief is indeed “because” of her good intellectual 
character, in the sense of ‘because’ which is relevant to virtue reliabilism? Even though 
exercises of cognitive faculties partially constitute exercises of character intellectual virtue, 
the work relevant to reliabilist accounts might be done simply by the constituents rather than 
by the character intellectual virtues per se. There are three considerations that suggest that the 
relevant work might be done by these faculty virtue constituents rather than by the character 
intellectual virtue itself.  
First, note some parallels between acting intentionally and acting from virtue. Both 
can be constituted by acts that could also be done without being intentional or virtuous. It is 
clear that an action’s value in explaining knowledge need not depend on it’s being intentional. 
Suppose that Charles decides to look out the window in order to learn what is going on 
outside. He does so and witnesses an elephant walking down the street. He intentionally did 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 58–59. 
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the looking and the looking gave him knowledge. But if he had unintentionally looked and 
seen the elephant, he would likewise have obtained knowledge.  
Here we have the constitution relation that Baehr appeals to: the intentional action is 
constituted by the looking just as the open-minded action is constituted by the examining of 
the documents, but the fact that the looking is intentional rather than unintentional does no 
explanatory work as to why Charles knows there is an elephant in the street. Similarly, if 
particular exercises of open-mindedness are constituted by actions or traits that are character 
neutral but relevant to the knowledge in question, the fact that someone acts open-mindedly 
might not do explanatory work as to why he knows. The explanation might lie simply with the 
character neutral traits that constituted that particular exercise of character intellectual virtue. 
The second consideration concerns the kind of case that we want if we are to establish 
open-mindedness or other character virtues as reliabilist knowledge-makers. Baehr attempts to 
show, via examples, that character virtues sometimes figure prominently into why an agent 
has a particular true belief or set of true beliefs and thus that they are salient causes. However, 
an alternative strategy often used by virtue reliabilists is to show cases of true belief that 
intuitively fail to amount to knowledge where a plausible explanation for this failure is that it 
was not produced virtuously. If we could show a case where true belief does not constitute 
knowledge because it was not obtained in an open-minded way, this would make a far 
stronger case for counting open-mindedness as a reliabilist virtue.  
This strategy coheres with the central idea of virtue reliabilism that knowledge must 
be obtained through appropriate virtues of the agent rather than (merely) through unreliable 
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processes or luck.34 It is this non-virtuous acquisition of belief that explains why it is not 
knowledge. So, for example, if while sitting in a philosophy seminar I come to believe that 
my formerly red Chevy Cavalier is bright blue, and it so happens that some mischievous 
person has just then spray painted it bright blue, I presumably do not know that it is bright 
blue. A plausible explanation of why I don’t know in this case is that I did not form the belief 
in a virtuous way (e.g. through a reliable faculty of vision or through heeding credible 
testimony). The exact vice that precludes my knowing will vary depending on the nature of 
the belief and the circumstances in which I obtained it. So, we do not have to show that the 
proposition could not be known without open-mindedness, but rather that in some 
circumstances open-mindedness, or the lack thereof, is what makes the difference between 
knowledge and mere true belief. 
Indeed we can modify the ending (italicized) of Baehr’s third case to bring it closer to 
this structure: 
CLOSED-MINDED HISTORIAN:  An historian has garnered international 
recognition and praise for a book in which she defends a certain view of how the 
religious faith of one of America's "founding fathers" influenced his politics. While 
researching her next book, the historian runs across some heretofore unexamined 
personal letters of this figure that blatantly contradict her own account of his theology 
and its effects on his political thought and behavior.  When she first looks at them she 
suspects that these letters won’t add additional support to her interpretation and that 
                                                 
34 Or even as opposed to reliable processes that are not sufficiently connected to the agent to count as an 
ability or excellence of him. 
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possibly they would require some reworking of her scheme, so she does not give them 
more than a cursory reading and does nothing to bring them to the attention of anyone 
else. What she does not realize is that more than requiring a minor reworking of her 
thesis they contain damning evidence against her interpretation. Thus the new 
evidence does not alter her belief and confidence. However, unbeknownst to her the 
letters are fabrications. As a matter of fact her account is fundamentally correct. 
If indeed, our historian lacks knowledge, this looks like a case where lack of open-
mindedness explains why her true belief is not knowledge. But it is not obvious whether she 
knows or not. It is worth exploring why her knowledge might not be undermined by this 
misleading defeating evidence in order to shed a little more light on different kinds of 
explanation for why someone does or does not reach the truth. What we have here is not a 
standard Gettier case where bad luck keeps justified belief from amounting to knowledge 
even while good luck makes the belief true, but rather, a case where vice makes belief 
objectionable but good luck means that the vice actually protected true belief. Whether luck 
can protect knowledge in these kinds of cases is a difficult question.35 But it is noteworthy 
that the actual basis of the belief is solid, and not only solid in the sense that it is genuine non-
misleading evidence, but also  solid in that it involves adequate evidence processed by a 
                                                 
35 This case is similar to the controversial case proposed by Gilbert Harman where a subject learns of a 
political leader’s assassination through an initial accurate report in a reliable newspaper, but does not see later 
news reports, due to government interference, which denied that it was an assassination. While Harman takes it 
that the subjects knowledge is undercut because she does not have the evidence that most around her do, 
misleading though it is, Mylan Engel and Duncan Pritchard have both argued that she does in fact know, since 
the luck concerns only what evidence she has and is not “veritic luck.” Engel, “Is Epistemic Luck Compatible 
with Knowledge?,” 65–66, 70–71; Duncan Pritchard, “Epistemic Luck,” Journal of Philosophical Research 29 
(2004): 208. 
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competent and (in many ways) virtuous agent.  While her ignoring these misleading letters is 
intellectually problematic it is not clear that it undermines the status of her beliefs based on 
her excellent evidence.  
On the other hand it is plausible to see this intellectual failure as undercutting 
knowledge.36 But even if the ignored letters undercut her knowledge, the explanation for why 
knowledge is undercut might still not be the absence of open-mindedness per se but rather the 
absence of proper exercise of cognitive faculties. Even though intellectual vice caused the 
epistemically poor performance, the specific explanation of why knowledge is undercut might 
be something more immediate than the vice of close-mindedness, such as not carefully 
balancing all available evidence. One reason to take this line is that virtue is not the only 
antidote to rejecting relevant evidence or other knowledge undermining practices, for non-
virtues and even vices could play the same role in mobilizing faculty virtues.  
This brings us to the third consideration suggesting that, in cases where the exercise of 
character intellectual virtues is constituted by the exercise of faculty virtues, it is the 
constituent faculty virtues that do the relevant explanatory work for the purposes of giving a 
reliabilist account of knowledge: Intellectual vices can cause knowledgeable belief in the 
same way as intellectual virtues.  
Surely there is an intellectually vicious curiosity, a curiosity that takes one away from 
intellectual goods by limiting one’s inquiries to valueless ends (e.g. a disposition, totally 
                                                 
36 Compare Baehr’s argument in chapter 5 of The Inquiring Mind that evidentialist accounts of 
justification and thus knowledge need to exclude certain cases where the evidence one has is skewed by 
intellectual vice. 
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devoid of any end of understanding nature, to count blades of grass).  Talbot Brewer 
delightfully describes “the vice of distracting fascination with triviality” which, though 
potentially quite fruitful for true beliefs, “can be part of a larger aversion to, or flight from, the 
struggle to understand the world and one’s place in it.”37 Similarly a desire to obtain as much 
negative truth about people as possible could mobilize me to pay careful attention in certain 
contexts. My seeking negative truth would even be partly constituted by my attentive 
behavior in those contexts. It is more obvious that this is not a moral virtue, but it is scarcely 
an intellectual or even epistemic virtue either, for there is no reason to think that a good 
orientation toward truth will result in a strong, almost exclusive, focus on truths that reflect 
negatively on people’s characters. It might even be an epistemic vice for the same reason as 
vicious curiosity. 
Consider the following example of obtaining knowledge through flouting one’s duties 
offered by Alvin Plantinga: 
Suppose I am thoroughly jaundiced and relish thinking the worst about you. I know 
that I suffer from this aberration, and ought to combat it, but do nothing whatever to 
correct it, taking a malicious pleasure in it. I barely overhear someone make a 
derogatory comment about you; I can barely make out his words, and, were it not for 
my ill will, I would not have heard them correctly. (Others thought he said your 
thought was deep and rigorous; because of my ill will I correctly heard him as saying 
that your thought is weak and frivolous.) In this case perhaps I am not doing my 
cognitive duty in forming the belief in question; I am flouting my duty to try to rid 
myself of my inclination to form malicious beliefs about you, and it is only because I 
am not doing my duty that I do form the belief in question. Yet surely it seems to have 
positive epistemic status for me.38 
 
                                                 
37 Talbot Brewer, The Retrieval of Ethics (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 297. 
38 Alvin Plantinga, “Justification and Theism,” Faith and Philosophy 4, no. 4 (October 1987): 412. 
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The duty to combat this relish for thinking ill may not be epistemic or even 
specifically intellectual, but what matters for the present purpose is simply that a trait which 
reflects negatively on one’s personal worth is performing the same function as the intellectual 
virtues are in Baehr’s cases—it explains the deployment of faculty virtues in such a way as to 
produce knowledge or justified belief. Further, this malice stands in the same relation to the 
belief as open-mindedness stands to the historian’s revised beliefs. For this case to do the 
work required here (or in Plantinga’s original argument) my relish of thinking ill of you 
cannot simply cause me to tilt one way when both ‘deep and rigorous’ and ‘weak and 
frivolous’ are equally supported by my auditory experience. Rather, it must mobilize me to 
listen more closely to what is said. The former option would bring in knowledge undermining 
luck, so this jaundice must be understood instead as leading me to pay careful attention 
(perhaps because I pick up on clues that the speaker is about to say something negative) and 
thereby putting me in a position to know what was said in the same way that open-
mindedness put the historian in a position to know what was implied by the letters.39  
Thus I find the claim unconvincing that virtue reliabilists should incorporate virtues of 
intellectual character into their accounts of knowledge. Excellence of intellectual character 
often plays the role of getting us to use our faculty virtues in the correct way, but that role, it 
seems, can on occasion by filled by vices. And, even when the exercise of a character virtue is 
                                                 
39 Even if vices couldn’t play the appropriate role, it seems clear that intellectual temperaments could. 
Recall that Baehr describes them as “natural” virtues distinguished from genuine virtues by the fact that the 
agent is not responsible for them in the say way and that he need not have a rational grasp of their point and 
value. The Inquiring Mind, 26–29 For example, it is hard to see how Baehr’s third case would be relevantly 
different if the historian acted from natural open-mindedness rather than from the character virtue of open-
mindedness. 
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constituted by excellent use of cognitive faculties, it is not necessary for the reliabilist to 
invoke that intellectual character virtue itself in order to explain the resulting knowledge. 
1.7. Conclusion: A Difference in Telos 
Baehr argues that intellectual character is significant both for addressing the concerns 
of mainstream analytic epistemology in giving an account of propositional knowledge and for 
expanding the scope of epistemological inquiry. With the latter claim I wholeheartedly agree, 
but I find his arguments that reliabilist accounts should make use of agency virtues 
unconvincing. This difficulty in making a tight connection between knowledge and 
intellectual character, suggests that thinking about intellectual character will drive us to 
expand our epistemology to other questions such as what knowledge , understanding and 
inquiry is (intellectually) important and worth pursuing. 
The fundamental issue seems to be that the telos of reliabilist virtues is not the same as 
the telos of intellectual virtues. The telos for intellectual character must involve a life that is 
good, intellectually speaking, while the telos of the virtues that could play the role that 
reliabilist virtues are supposed to play would have to be tightly connected with obtaining 
warrant for particular propositions without regard to whether or not it is good for one to 
investigate those matters. It is not just that I can obtain warrant without having full intellectual 
virtue, for that might only mean that I can get warrant about some things without getting the 
whole way to intellectual virtue, just as I can do some things rightly without attaining unto 
full ethical virtue. Nor is just that I can get warrant about some propositions without the 
exercise of virtue.  Rather, it is that the central concerns and aims are different and thus can be 
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expected to conflict. The telos of reliabilist virtues involves knowledge of any proposition 
whatsoever, whereas the telos of intellectual virtue limits what knowledge is worth pursuing 
in what contexts.40  
This is not simply the question of the unity of the virtues. While courage seems bound 
to come apart from the master virtue of practical wisdom since it seems that one can exercise 
courage even in a foolish action or project, there are various strategies to show that these 
virtues can’t come apart. It might be argued that seeming courage which is not directed at a 
sufficient good is therefore not courage but only rashness. Similarly, while committed 
friendships might seem at odds with the overall virtue of properly valuing and respecting all 
people, Thomas Scanlon has suggested in response that a proper conception of friendship 
must include the friends honoring each other qua persons, and so honoring those outside of 
the friendship as well. As he says, a friend prepared to steal a kidney for me would be 
“unnerving” not merely because of my regard for third parties, but also because his view of 
my right to my “own body parts, is contingent on the fact that “he happens to like” me.41 
Whatever the merits of these attempts at unification, it is noteworthy that these 
strategies cannot be employed to integrate reliabilist virtues with whatever might be the 
master intellectual virtue. The difference in telos is more radical. For reliabilism is concerned 
                                                 
40 Sosa recognizes this point and notes that we should distinguish between “theory of knowledge” and 
“intellectual ethics” as two parts of epistemology. Sosa does not think of intellectual ethics simply as morality in 
general applied to intellectual questions; rather it “involves sensitivity to the full span of intellectual values,” and 
concerns what questions “are worth pursuing from an intellectual point of view.” Sosa, A Virtue Epistemology, 
89–90. 
41 Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2000), 164–165. 
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to give an account of what it is that constitutes knowledge of any proposition whatsoever, and 
reliabilist virtues clearly need not be regulated by overall virtue to achieve this telos. While 
some dispositions or attainments that seem to reveal intellectual excellence might not actually 
be intellectual excellence if they conflict with the telos of intellectual virtue or some master 
intellectual virtue, such considerations in themselves cannot undermine the status of beliefs as 
propositional knowledge. Perhaps curiosity is not always an intellectual excellence, but this is 
irrelevant to whether we know the things we learn because of it. Intellectual vices can lead to 
knowledge. 
While, most of this paper has simply aimed to undercut Baehr’s argument that if 
reliabilist theories of knowledge are correct then intellectual virtues will play a role in the 
analysis of knowledge, this fundamental difference in telos suggests that it is unlikely that 
character virtues need to play into an account of propositional knowledge. The philosophical 
connections between intellectual character and the analysis of knowledge are likely to be less 
direct. 
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2. Knowledge, Ethics, and Socrates: Two Questions about the Digression 
in the Theaetetus 
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ABSTRACT: I address an interpretive puzzle in Plato’s Theaetetus. In a short passage, Plato 
seems to deviate from arguing against a Protagorean account of knowledge and has Socrates 
deliver a description of two rival ways of life that turns into an exhortation to practice justice. 
The passage contrasts men shaped by life in the courts with those shaped by philosophy. This 
“digression” raises questions both about its relationship to the surrounding attempts to analyze 
knowledge and about the relationship between the detached philosophers portrayed in the 
digression and Socrates. I argue the digression serves to reveal the implications of the 
Protagorean account of knowledge for evaluating who has true wisdom about life, and that the 
philosophers portrayed in the digression are sufficiently and relevantly like Socrates that the 
digression also serves to advocate a Socratic lifestyle against a Protagorean lifestyle. 
2.1. Introduction 
Plato’s Theaetetus most centrally concerns what knowledge is. But in the midst of that 
discussion stands a five page section which develops a stark contrast between litigious men42 
and philosophers (172c-177c). This passage is commonly called the “digression,” as Socrates 
himself describes it (177c).43 It discusses ethics and concludes with an exhortation to justice 
and piety. The man brought up in the courts is a slave to the jury and to the conventions that 
govern his speeches. He must persuade his audience within the time limit imposed by the 
court on pain of loss of possessions, position, or even life. He is not free to take whatever time 
is needed to find the truth. Courtroom practice renders him skilled in flattery but warped in 
soul. The philosopher, on the other hand, grows up without even knowing where the courts 
are or what the laws are. He pays no attention to high society and pride in ancestry. His mind 
is absent from the city, seeking rather to geometrize on earth and astronomize in heaven. 
Since he is concerned with the nature of humanity, rather than with particular people, he is 
                                                 
42 I owe the term to Julia Annas. Platonic Ethics, Old and New, 54. 
43 Plato, trans. M.J. Levett, and rev. Myles Burnyeat, “Theaetetus”; all quotations from Plato’s 
dialogues are taken from the English translations found in Plato: Complete Works edited by John M. Cooper and 
D.S. Hutchinson. 
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without resources for social maneuvering. But the man of the courts is equally disconcerted 
when he must consider the nature of justice or human happiness. Unlike the philosopher, he 
cannot suitably praise “the life of gods and of the happy among men” (176a). At this point in 
the speech, Theodorus applauds Socrates’ praise of the philosopher and claims heeding it 
would result in “more peace and less evil on the earth” (176a). Socrates then shifts from his 
contrast between narrowly practical44 concerns and theoretical concerns to a specifically 
ethical focus. The only way to escape from the evil on the earth is to become godlike by 
becoming “just and pure [pious]45, with understanding” (176b). Being just makes one like the 
good pattern of reality, while doing injustice, as the men of the courts cultivate the means to 
do, renders one like the bad pattern and condemned to live a bad life on the earth, “a life after 
his own likeness” (177a). 
Many treat the digression as insignificant with regards to the philosophical task of the 
Theaetetus, perhaps largely because it is an ethical monologue and exhortation embedded in a 
rigorous epistemological discussion.46  Commentaries on the Theaetetus often give the 
digression scant and sometimes dismissive attention.47  One view is that the digression alludes 
to Plato’s arguments elsewhere against relativism about justice, since Socrates does not refute 
                                                 
44 Most of Socrates examples concern politics, but the ignorance of the philosopher seems to encompass 
all of practical life. 
45 David Sedley notes that the references to piety here and at 172a (where piety is included with justice 
as a value that some partial Protagoreans consider relative) are obscured my many English translations. The 
Midwife of Platonism, 64 n16. 
46 It is also common for authors to comment on how others fail to see it as significant. Sedley comments 
that while certain themes have attracted scrutiny, “no one has made much progress with integrating the 
digression, taken as a whole, into the dialogue in which it is found.” Chappell notes that many consider the 
digression “philosophical backwater.” Ibid., 63; Chappell, Reading Plato’s Theaetetus, 19. 
47 Bostock, Plato’s Theaetetus, 98–99 devotes just over a page to the digression and labels his 
discussion of it a “postscript.” 
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the modified Protagoreanism mentioned just before the digression which involves relativism 
about justice and piety but not about the useful.48 It has also been suggested that the 
digression gestures toward an account of knowledge in terms of forms which Plato develops 
elsewhere but does not employ in the dialectic of the Theaetetus.49 On the other hand it has 
been suggested that the digression does not contribute to the question of the nature of 
knowledge, but only emphasizes what is worth knowing.50  
The digression certainly stands out from the surrounding argumentation, but it fits 
with and is linked to the dramatic frame of the Theaetetus. When Theodorus points out that 
they have plenty of time to pursue the digression, Socrates replies “we appear to” (172c, 
emphasis added), and at the end of the conversation Socrates says he must leave to meet the 
affidavit against him.   The reader knows this affidavit will lead to his trial, where he explains 
his own inexperience in the courtroom (Ap. 17c-18a) and regrets having only a brief time to 
reply to the charges against him (Ap. 18e-19a, 23e-24a). The digression proceeds to contrast 
                                                 
48 John McDowell, Theaetetus: Translated with Notes, 174 One could argue against McDowell that 
relativism about justice is refuted at 177c-178a, and in the following prediction argument, since it is agreed that 
legislation aims at the useful and what will turn out to be useful is not a matter of convention. Of course, Plato 
would want to connect useful legislation quite tightly with justice. However to make that move against relativism 
about justice we would have to turn to arguments developed by Plato elsewhere. 
49 Francis Cornford, Plato’s Theory of Knowledge, 88–89; Burnyeat offers this as a possible 
interpretation associated with what he terms “Reading A.” This reading sees the dialogue as aiming to show that 
there cannot be knowledge of sensible things and so as doing ground clearing work for the theory of forms 
developed elsewhere. The alleged textual reference to the forms involves the phrasing of the philosophers 
questions concerning “What is Man” (174b) and “justice and injustice themselves” (175b). Burnyeat say the 
question is whether the phrases here “imply more metaphysics than is actually expressed. The Theaetetus of 
Plato, 36–38; McDowell states that the view that digression alludes to the forms cannot be refuted but that there 
is no reason to think it hints at an answer in terms of the forms to the problem of knowledge. Theaetetus: 
Translated with Notes, 177. 
50 Burnyeat, The Theaetetus of Plato, 98 offers this as an alternate interpretation. Here, as throughout 
his introduction to the dialogue, he is concerned to lead his readers to an informed confrontation with the 
interpretive options rather than deciding the issues in the text. But his sympathies seem to lie with this reading of 
the digression. 
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the modes of discussion and persuasion in philosophy with those of the courts, where the 
speaker is constrained by the clock and the sworn affidavit against him. It offers an 
explanation for why the philosopher will not fare well by court standards, which clearly 
alludes to Socrates’ death.51  
The digression focuses on the upbringings that result in the two ways of life, (indeed, 
the contrast is first framed as between those “brought up in philosophy” and those who have 
spent their time in places like the courts since boyhood). Thus, it also picks up the theme from 
the early part of the dialogue concerning the education and development of the young. There 
Socrates is concerned to find out “which [Athenian] young men show signs of turning out 
well” (143d). Theaetetus is studying geometry and Theodorus praises him for his all-around 
excellent character, especially in relation to his studies. Theaetetus himself inherited property, 
which could have drawn him in to the affairs and ways of the court, but Theodorus praises 
him as “wonderfully open-handed about money” (144a-c). At the close of the dialogue 
Theaetetus’ character comes up again when Socrates expresses his hope that this philosophic 
discussion will render his future conduct gentler and more modest than it might otherwise be 
(210c). 
These connections with the frame suggest that the digression is not merely a 
digression. But they do not show us how the digression (or the introduction and conclusion 
for that matter) relates to the main line of argument in the Theaetetus, which concerns the 
nature of knowledge. How are the digression's ethical themes connected to the surrounding 
                                                 
51 Thought, as we will see there is the key difference that Socrates avoids a certain type of defense for 
the sake of virtue while the philosophers avoid it out of ignorance. 
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arguments about the nature of knowledge, and more specifically to the immediately 
surrounding arguments against Protagorean epistemology? In the first half of this paper, 
entitled “The Digression and Epistemology,” I argue that Plato’s conception of knowledge as 
wisdom (or ‘expertise’) is crucial to seeing how the digression is about epistemology. The 
passage is a digression because it is not concerned with all instances of knowledge and 
wisdom, but rather with what it is to be fully wise. This naturally leads to the large topic of 
the best way to lead a life. But ethical knowledge is of course an instance of knowledge more 
generally, and the digression functions both to reveal the implications of a Protagorean 
conception of knowledge when applied to wisdom about life and to provide an argument 
against that conception. 
But if the ethical material in the digression is important for the argument against 
Protagoreanism in which it is embedded, this makes a second puzzle all the more pressing. To 
what extent can the philosophers and the ethical exhortations of the digression be reconciled 
with the practice and ideals of Socrates? Their disregard for their neighbors and ignorance of 
all practical affairs does not seem to align with Socratic practice or Socratic ideals. While 
commentators frequently mention this,52 Sandra Peterson raises the problem particularly 
forcefully. She lists a number of specific contrasts between these philosophers and Socrates. 
Unlike them he spends time in the marketplace, understands the laws, and knows how to get 
                                                 
52 Cf. David Sedley, “we will see Socrates’ picture of ideal philosophical detachment further developed 
into what has often come over to readers as advocacy of a callous disregard for his fellow citizens.” The Midwife 
of Platonism, 67; Julia Annas declares the differences to pose “insoluble problems” (55) for reconciling the 
philosophers of the digression with Socrates. She argues however that this reveals a deep tension in Platonic 
thought between two notions of becoming like God. One which involves a flight from the world and another 
which can be carried out by the practice of virtue in the world. Platonic Ethics, Old and New, 52–71. 
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to court. Further, he emphasizes avoiding actual instances of injustice53 and is intensely 
interested in particular people,54 whereas the philosophers scarcely know whether their 
neighbors are human or not.55 What then do we make of this ethical section that seems to 
present an un-Socratic ethic?  
In the second half of this paper, entitled “The Digression and Socrates,” I argue that 
while Socrates certainly compares the philosophers favorably against the litigious men, the 
central emphasis of the digression is not in conflict with Socrates’ life. The ethical thrust of 
the digression becomes both more dominant and more clearly Socratic over the course of the 
digression. Socrates' ethical commitments shape what aspects of the philosophers’ 
absentminded ignorance he mentions when praising them. And while he starts by contrasting 
theoretical inquiry and worldly involvement, he skillfully transitions to a conclusion that 
contrasts justice with injustice and so ends not with an exhortation to contemplative 
withdrawal, but with a warning against acting unjustly.  
                                                 
53 Would the philosopher also think it important to avoid actual injustice? His exclusive concern with 
the natures of things and utter lack of attention to particulars suggest he would not be vigilantly monitoring his 
doings for justice, though he would not deliberately do injustice. Peterson’s evidence for the claim that he would 
not concern himself with avoiding unjust conduct is that he “induces people to abandon the question: ‘What 
injustice might I be doing to you or you to me?’ ” (Peterson, Socrates and Philosophy in the Dialogues of Plato, 
62.) However, in context (175b-d) that quote could simply refer to him getting people to consider the nature of 
justice carefully rather than blindly arguing their cases (for the purposes of litigation at that!).  I argue below that 
this passage represents part of Socrates’ transition from a focus on absentminded abstract contemplation to a 
focus on acting virtuously. 
54 Ibid., 61–62. 
55 Her way of solving the difficulty is to attribute the claims of the digression to Theodorus, and she 
denies that Socrates endorses the claims of the digression. Ibid., 67–71. 
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2.2. The Digression and Epistemology 
2.2.1. The Socratic Quest for Wisdom 
Socrates motivates the question of knowledge with his claim that “men are wise 
about” “the things which they know.” Thus he claims that knowledge of something makes one 
wise (or “expert”) about it (145d-e). Scott Hemmenway points out that it is only after this 
identification that Socrates declares “his puzzlement and his incapacity, unaided, to get hold 
of what knowledge is.” Hemmenway takes this to indicate that Socrates is really interested in 
wisdom, which is the philosopher’s epistemic quest.56 The notion of wisdom is indeed key to 
understanding the relation of the digression to the epistemological argumentation of the 
Theaetetus, but we must be careful with the claim that the Theaetetus as a whole is about 
wisdom, since wisdom about some object or other does not necessarily make one Wise in the 
way that most fully exemplifies what wisdom is (hereafter, I will use an initial capital to refer 
specifically to Wisdom of this latter sort).57 I will say a bit more about the distinction between 
Wisdom and being wise about a given object after I note how the digression is tied to the 
Apology, with its emphasis on Wisdom. 
Socrates’ parting note that he is headed for court leaves the dialogue under the shadow 
of the events of the Apology.  Like the Apology, the digression features Socrates’ ethical 
exhortations and his claim not to know the ways of the court and so not to be able to give the 
customary kind of speech (Ap. 17d-18a). However, Socrates makes clear that he has the know 
how to make the kind of defense likely to avail in court and deliberately avoids it because it 
                                                 
56 Hemmenway, “Philosophical Apology in the Theaetetus,” 324. 
57 Capitalization for “Wise” and “Wisdom” then is not used to indicate reference to a form. 
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would be vicious (Ap. 38e-39b). In this he differs from the philosopher who is literally 
ignorant of the ways of the court. Nonetheless the digression clearly foreshadows his trial and 
draws the same contrast between the philosophers and the litigious men that the Apology 
draws between Socrates and his accusers. At his trial he says his accusers are “condemned by 
truth to wickedness and injustice” (Ap. 39b)—the same fate that the digression claims awaits 
the unjust (“the penalty of living the life that corresponds to” the bad pattern 177a).  
But the Apology is also concerned with knowledge. Socrates is on trial for impiety, but 
he contends the trial is really driven by the fact that he has exposed the pretensions of certain 
respected people to knowledge and Wisdom (Ap. 21-23). In the Euthyphro, which is also set 
on the day when he meets his indictment, Socrates rejects various definitions of piety and 
ends with professed puzzlement. In the Theaetetus, he does the same in regard to knowledge. 
So both dialogues examine central themes from the Apology. Thus, it is not only the 
Theaetetus’ setting which links it to the Apology, but also its central theme: knowledge. The 
particular shared themes in the digression are more obviously ethical than epistemological, 
but they have to do with Wisdom and so with knowledge. 
2.2.2. “Wise” Versus “Wise About X” 
When Socrates claims his fellow citizens lack Wisdom, he is not asserting that they 
have no knowledge of any sort. When he criticizes the craftsmen and poets in the Apology, he 
says that having a certain wisdom in regard to their crafts, they falsely thought themselves 
“very Wise in other most important pursuits, and this error of theirs overshadowed the 
wisdom they had”. Socrates concludes that he is better off as he is, “with neither their wisdom 
nor their ignorance,” than he would be if he had both (Ap. 22d-e). He considers himself better 
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off even with respect to Wisdom, for he takes this to vindicate the oracular claim that he is the 
Wisest of men (Ap. 23a-b). Being wise about some object does not suffice to make one Wise. 
The relationship between the digression and the line of argument in which it is 
embedded can be put in terms of these two notions. The digression concerns Wisdom, being a 
Wise person, while most of the dialogue concerns wisdom in general, what it is to be wise 
about some arbitrary object. Knowledge makes one wise about a thing and there are many 
things that one might be wise about. Thus Plato can discuss what it is to know hotness or 
hardness (157a) or to know a wagon (207a-c). But the digression concerns being Wise, not 
merely about this or that, but Wise in a way that most fully exemplifies the nature of Wisdom. 
Thus the passage arises quite naturally out of the argument since it involves the specific 
implications of the Protagorean account of wisdom in general for that particular kind of 
Wisdom which is involved in being a Wise person. But the passage is also clearly a 
“digression” (177c) since it focuses on some of the details and implications of Wisdom (and 
does so by contrasting the upbringing and lifestyle of two groups of people), rather than 
focusing on the abstract discussion of wisdom of all sorts about whatever objects. This 
“greater discussion” (172c) comes up naturally in the course of the argument (172a-b, 177c-d) 
but it is pursued only in the digression (This will be discussed in more detail in the next 
section). The remainder of this first part of the paper will examine how the digression exhibits 
the Protagorean conception of Wisdom and how it can serve as an argument against that 
conception. 
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2.2.3. Ability and Wisdom for Socrates and Protagoras 
The digression highlights two conceptions of ability: getting one’s way in the law 
courts and similar places, versus escaping evil by becoming as just as possible. Socrates 
famously connects ability to Wisdom and justice, and, at least as construed in the Theaetetus, 
the Protagoreans do as well. Thus rival conceptions of Wisdom, ability, and justice are in play 
in the digression.  
Socrates expounds the connection in the Gorgias (467c-468e). Power is the ability to 
get what one wants, but one wants the real good, so if one does not know what is good, one 
does not have power. Coupled with Socratic claim that the virtuous action is always better 
than the vicious action, the (surprising) result is that only the virtuous are powerful since only 
they rightly understand what actions are for the sake of the good.  Similarly in the Apology, 
Socrates claims that avoiding wickedness reveals his true achievement of something good. It 
is easier to avoid death than to avoid wickedness, provided one is willing “to do or say 
anything in order to avoid it.” He maintains he is better off than his accusers even though he 
will lose his life, since he has avoided wickedness but they “are condemned by truth to 
wickedness and injustice” (38e-39b). And in the digression Socrates exhorts us not to allow 
that one who is blasphemous or practices injustice has any sort of ability (176d). Genuine 
ability is the ability to get what is genuinely good, which requires knowledge concerning what 
is good.  And this, Socrates is convinced, will always vindicate the practice of virtue. 
In the Theaetetus Socrates imagines Protagoras giving an account of Wisdom and 
ability and its connection to justice at 166d-167d. At this point it will be helpful to give an 
overview of Protagorean epistemology and the arguments raised against it. Protagoras comes 
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into view when Socrates identifies Theaetetus’ suggestion that knowledge is perception with 
the famous Protagorean claim that “Man [humanity / a human (ἄνθρωπον)] is the measure of 
all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are 
not” (151e-152a). This thesis is fleshed out to entail that every judgment is true. Socrates 
presents several initial objections, two of which will be important for our purposes. For one 
thing dreamers and insane people believe many things that certainly seem to be false of them 
(157e). For another this seems to destroy the notion of expertise since there is no such thing as 
one having correct rather than incorrect judgments.  Arguments and philosophical 
investigations would be silly since everyone’s beliefs are true for him. Given this claim, 
Protagoras has no claim to being wiser than his fellow humans whom he charges large fees 
for teaching or even than a pig or baboon (161c-162a). But Socrates is not content to rest with 
these objections and attempts to give a response on behalf of Protagoras which includes an 
exhortation for them to deal with his position in a serious and mature way (165e-168e). 
This response develops the Protagorean account of expertise which I argue is 
illustrated by the litigious man in the digression. While everyone’s perceptions are true it is 
better for one to have some (true) perceptions than to have other (also true) perceptions. The 
doctor is an expert (wise), not because he can make the sick man perceive the taste of food 
more truly, but because he can make the food taste different and it is better that the food taste 
the latter way. What the doctor accomplishes is to make it true for the man that the food is 
non-bitter rather than bitter as it was when he was sick (166e-167a). This model is not 
restricted to tastes, smells and such. Rather it extends to all of education and politics as well. 
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The expert teacher causes other things to be true for his students and is thus worth his 
substantial price. The politician influences the citizens so that other things seem just to them 
and thus are just. He changes the conventions so that wholesome things are just rather than 
unwholesome things (167a-d). This does not explain by what standard the revised perceptions 
are better or the revised conventions more wholesome. But it does exhibit a conception of the 
expert or wise one (whether as wise about a limited domain or as Wise) as one who changes 
how things seem to people rather than as one who knows how things really are. 
After offering this account of expertise on behalf of Protagoras, Socrates compels 
Theodorus to serve as interlocutor instead of Theaetetus, allegedly because talking with an 
older man makes the argument more serious (168d-e). Socrates offers two primary arguments 
against the Protagorean view. The first, the self-refutation argument, exploits the irony that 
Protagoras must allow that other peoples’ judgments that he is wrong are true. The second is 
the prediction argument. Ultimately this argument will be applied to all judgments that 
concern how things will be in the future (178a-e). Socrates begins, however, by noting two 
plausible restrictions on Protagorean epistemology. In the case of individuals few will allow 
that creature is infallible on what is conducive to its health, even if they are relativists about 
warmth, dryness, sweetness etc. (171e). In the case of cities few will claim the city is 
infallible about what course will in fact turn out to be in its interest, even if they are 
conventionalist relativists about justice and piety (172a-b). Socrates takes the prediction 
argument to be decisive against unrestricted Protagorean relativism but not against a restricted 
relativism regarding “the present experience of the individual” (179c).  
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2.2.4. The Digression as an Elaboration of Protagoreanism about Wisdom 
But what about the view that justice and piety are whatever any city by its conventions 
takes them to be? Socrates secures agreement that legislation aims at what is useful for the 
city and that what is useful is not a matter of convention (177e). But he does not say anything 
there about where that leaves justice and piety. All that is said outside the digression is that 
many are conventionalists about these qualities but are not audacious enough to be 
conventionalists about what is useful (172a-b, 177c-d). This view of Wisdom58 is “a greater 
discussion emerging from the lesser one (172b). Theaetetus comments that they have plenty 
of time to pursue this discussion, which launches the digression. Combined with the fact that 
justice and piety are prominent in the digression this strongly suggests that the digression is a 
response to these partial Protagoreans. 
The digression helps reveal what this Protagorean conception of expertise—that is, of 
what it is to be wise about something—comes to in the case of being Wise. Andrew Barker 
explains how the men of the law court serve as an example of what it means to live according 
to a Protagorean view of knowledge and reality. He notes that these men of the courts are 
preeminently those who can get the results that seem best to them in public policy. They 
would be “the ‘wise’ in matters of morals, if the Protagoreans were right” about the likes of 
justice and piety and these really did just consist in “what the state through the medium of its 
laws and customs temporarily took them to be.” Thus the “common, niggling, scheming and 
                                                 
58 I take “wisdom” here to refer to the qualities that the partial Protagoreans think are a matter of 
convention such as justice, piety, and what it is fitting to do. But perhaps the phrase “some such view of 
wisdom” refers the conjunction of conventionalism about these qualities and anti-relativism about the interests of 
the city. 
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dishonest lawyer” would turn out to be the Wise man. Barker suggests that this would be “a 
sufficient reductio ad absurdum” for Plato.59 And certainly Plato has deep seated differences 
with such a conception of expertise. Given Socrates’ assumption that it is not feasible to teach 
in the courts but only to persuade by techniques that do not lead to understanding (Apology 
19a, 35c; Gorgias 454e-455a), he clearly would not take these men of the courts to operate as 
genuine teachers. And given his ethical commitments he clearly does not think that the good 
is as it seems to them. 
2.2.5. The Digression as an Argument against Protagoreanism about Wisdom 
But if we grant that the digression portrays the anti-Socratic Protagorean “Wise-man,” 
this still leaves the question why Plato takes the space to describe him here and how this 
might contribute to his arguments. The contribution could of course be indirect. One 
possibility is that Plato is not using the digression as an argument against the Protagorean 
position, but rather using it to show that the practice of the law courts presupposes something 
like a Protagorean epistemology. For someone attuned to the weaknesses of the Protagorean 
position, as Theaetetus is becoming, this could show problems with that kind of life. On the 
other hand, it could serve as a vivid portrayal of what the Protagorean thesis really amounts 
to. Even if it did not directly furnish evidence against that thesis it would still be helpful to 
show what the thesis entails or what it looks like when fleshed out. But as we will see, 
fleshing out the consequences of the position also yields an argument against it, though it may 
be dialectically weak. 
                                                 
59 Barker, “The Digression in the ‘Theaetetus,’” 459. 
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Barker offers one construal of the digression as an argument against Protagoreanism. 
However, he classes it among the popular objections to Protagoreanism such as the dream 
argument (157-158d) or the argument from the claim that pig is not the measure of all things 
(161c), which rely “on the common interpretation of common experiences”. Barker says these 
arguments can be attacked by denying the relevant underlying common sense assumption. For 
example, one who is prepared to deny that dreams are really false for the dreamer when he is 
dreaming will be unmoved by the argument that, since dreams do not correspond to reality, 
not every seeming is true. Barker also classes the self-refutation argument and the argument 
that usefulness is not merely a matter of convention, which is the immediate context for the 
digression, as popular arguments.60 He interprets the digression as a popular appeal to beliefs 
about morality: “philosophers do talk about universal moral natures” which “are demonstrably 
not the same as particular local conventions”; thus, not all moral truth is conventional.  
Clearly, such an argument would beg the question against those who deny that philosophers 
manage to talk (truly) about such things.61  
However, the self-refutation argument and the prediction argument in which the 
digression is embedded come after Socrates has criticized the first set of arguments and after 
he has put away childish argumentation (i.e. quit using a youngster as his interlocutor) and 
forced Theodorus to engage as his discussion partner (168c-e). The argument about usefulness 
naturally generalizes to matters of prediction in general since judgments about usefulness 
depend on predictions about what the results will be from certain courses of action (178a). 
                                                 
60 He does admit, however, that they are subtler. Ibid., 458. 
61 Ibid., 462. 
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And it is the prediction argument which Socrates takes to be decisive against Protagoras 
(179a-b). While Socrates admits that the prediction argument doesn’t work against all forms 
of Protagoreanism, he does think it succeeds in refuting Protagoreanism regarding things that 
are not the present experience of individuals (179b-c).  The digression is clearly situated in a 
context of serious engagement with the Protagorean position under consideration. 
In fact, the digression can be seen as an argument of the same sort as the prediction 
argument. While it is dialectically less persuasive, it is nonetheless a serious argument. The 
prediction argument is compelling because future experience will be what it will be regardless 
of what I or the city think it will be. Experts can be recognized because of what they say about 
the future even if no one defers to them about their present experience. Planning based on 
incorrect beliefs about future experience can lead to harm that is undeniable, even by the 
agent’s own lights. Similarly, the digression tells us that there are truths about good and bad 
and getting this wrong will have serious consequences. The one who gets it wrong about 
goodness becomes trapped by his own wickedness and is stuck leading an impoverished and 
twisted life. However, those who insist that goodness and badness are simply a matter of what 
seems good and bad to them can deny this. Even in the future, these characters will not 
recognize that they have ended up as bad men leading a bad life, for it will still seem to them 
as if they are taking the best course. Others, not in the grip of Protagorean views about justice 
and similar matters, such as Theaetetus and Theodorus perhaps, might appreciate the force of 
the argument. 
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2.2.6. Interim Conclusion: A Relevant Digression 
The issue between the Socratic ethic of acting justly and piously and the Protagorean 
ethic of obtaining what seems good to one is a large issue, both in the sense that it requires 
much to adequately discuss it and in the sense that it is important. Thus Socrates does have to 
limit his pursuit of the theme and return to the main topic (177c).  And since the topic is the 
nature of knowledge in general, the focus on only some knowledge—that involved in being 
Wise —is a digression. But it is a natural digression in that it is a closer examination of one 
part of the topic.  This examination serves to reveal the implications of the Protagorean 
doctrine applied to Wisdom and argues that not all things that seem good lead to a good end. 
With its exhortation to practice justice rather than injustice, it also fulfills a key part of 
Socrates' philosophical mission: to reproach those who do not care about virtue (Apology 29e-
30a). By exposing the pretensions of the men of the courts, the digression also helps to fulfill 
the other part of his mission, which involves exposing those who claim to be Wise but are not.  
These greater concerns are not independent of the question of the nature of knowledge. 
2.3. The Digression and Socrates 
2.3.1. Introduction 
I have argued that the digression is relevant to the epistemological theme of the 
Theaetetus. I have appealed to the role of knowledge and wisdom in Socratic ethics and to the 
importance for Socrates’ mission of investigating whether people claiming to be Wise are 
actually Wise. In making that argument, I have emphasized the connection of the digression 
to the Apology and to other dialogues that contrast Socrates with would be Wise-men. But the 
explicit contrast in the digression concerns philosophers who are quite different from 
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Socrates. Thus the second puzzle is pressing: what is the relationship between Socrates’ life 
and the life of the philosophers and between Socrates’ life and the ethical import of the 
digression? 
2.3.2. Denials that the Digression is Socratic  
Generally commentators view the digression as advocating an ethic incompatible with 
Socrates’ life.62  Peterson’s position (referenced above) is perhaps the most extreme. She 
concludes that the digression is simply Socrates’ “extraction” of the views of the geometer 
Theodorus, and thus represents Socrates’ interlocutor.63 She argues not only that Socrates and 
Plato do not endorse the claims of the digression since they have not been tested by Socratic 
cross-examination, but also that the claims insofar as she can assess them are wildly 
implausible.64 Other commentators note discrepancies between the digression and the 
Socrates of the Socratic dialogues and take Plato to be indicating that we should move beyond 
Socrates to the Platonic ethic described in the digression.65  
Both positions exaggerate the significance of their key insights. Peterson is right that 
Socrates plays to the sympathies of the mathematician Theodorus, and that we don’t need to 
take him be advocating for every characteristic of the philosophers’ life. Others are right that 
the digression endorses an ethical message, but they underestimate that message's Socratic 
                                                 
62 For an exception see Rachel Rue who argues that the digression portrays the shortcomings of both 
orators and philosophers as compared to Socrates. “The Philosopher in Flight.” 
63 Peterson, Socrates and Philosophy in the Dialogues of Plato, 71–74. 
64 Ibid., 79–82. 
65 “Plato often hints that we must go beyond Socrates to get to the true philosophy, Platonism; perhaps 
so here.” Chappell, Reading Plato’s Theaetetus, 122–123 n103; Sedley suggests that Socrates’ greater interest in 
his neighbors is a shortcoming from the ideal which is necessitated by his role as a midwife. The Midwife of 
Platonism, 67–68. 
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bent.  These scholars put too much emphasis on the stark absent-mindedness presented at the 
beginning of the digression and fail to notice Socrates' shift in emphasis over the course of the 
digression. 
2.3.3 The Shift in Emphasis in the Digression and its Socratic Conclusion 
It is crucial to note that there is movement in the digression. The precise character of 
the contrast between the philosophers and the men of the courts changes over the course of 
the digression and so does the extent to which Socrates identifies with and advocates the 
philosophic side of the contrast. Socrates introduces the philosophers as “our own set” thus 
including both himself and the mathematician Theodorus in the category (173b). However, 
the philosophers described in detail are the “leaders” rather than “second-rate specimens,” 
(173c).  The language here may imply that the philosophers he is about to describe represent 
the full and the best philosophic life, as opposed to the inferior partial realization in Socrates. 
However, it could be read as the weaker assertion that they carry certain aspects of the 
philosophic life further than most, including further than Socrates.66 This reading need not 
entail that Socrates’ life is ethically inferior, especially if his lifestyle is based on a divine 
commission. And it still allows Socrates to exploit the clear contrast between these 
philosophers and the litigious men in order to show the deficiencies of the latter. I prefer the 
latter reading because I take the ethical exhortation of the digression to involve features of the 
philosophic life that these philosophers share with Socrates (and some Socratic traits which it 
is not clear whether they share or not) rather than features which are not Socratic. 
                                                 
66 Compare Rue. She, however, argues that the digression illustrates the philosophic tendency “to look 
to essences and eternal truths” while scorning particulars to an unhealthy and “self-defeating” extreme. “The 
Philosopher in Flight,” 91. 
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 Initially, Socrates identifies with the starkly portrayed absent-minded philosophers in 
that he is concerned for accuracy (hitting upon what is) in his investigations rather than with 
quick persuasions (“It is so with us now” 172d). The lengthy description of the philosopher 
that follows (173d-175c) does not comment on the relative admirableness of the 
characteristics described, but Theodorus affirms its accuracy as a description of these 
“leaders” among philosophers (175c). Socrates presumably groups himself with the 
philosophers when he says that the litigious man’s inability to discuss justice or human 
happiness in general causes entertainment to all “who have not been brought up like slaves” 
(175c-d). Socrates straightforwardly endorses the final section of the digression. It consists in 
an exhortation in his own voice to become just and pious, together with a warning about the 
consequences of injustice (176a-177a). 
This increasing level of endorsement by Socrates corresponds to an increasingly 
ethical focus. Throughout the digression there is movement from description of the 
philosopher as detached from his neighbors in favor of abstract theoretical understanding, to 
an exhortation to detachment from the means of getting one's way in favor of the virtuous life. 
In the initial description of the extreme philosopher, he is concerned with geometry and 
astronomy, and with the general nature of Man and knows nothing of what is in front of him67 
                                                 
67 Compare mathematician Jerry King’s description of late twentieth century mathematicians in his 
book on mathematics and the state of the profession “…had the mathematicians the power to see to it, the 
administrators would disappear…. As time passed, litter would pile up in the corridors, the grass would grow tall 
outside, and one by one the phones would fail. Other faculty—more attuned to the ‘outside world’—would 
notice the campus crumbling away around them. They would become aware of the loss of services: research 
grant applications not getting processed, applications for next year’s admission piling up on a table somewhere, 
next semester’s teaching schedule failing to appear. Soon these outside faculty would notice something else: the 
absence of the limousines and helicopters that used to come and go bringing the well-heeled campus visitors to 
tour the facilities on the arm of the president and to leave behind generous contributions toward the university’s 
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(Though the end of this description implies he reflects on the foolish practices that he 
encounters in his neighbors! For, he hears and dismisses as foolish the boasts of power, land, 
and ancestry (174d-175b)). Then when Socrates turns to describe the predicament of the man 
of the courts when encountering the philosopher’s questions, the subject becomes justice and 
injustice as well as human happiness and misery. This discussion still concerns justice and 
happiness in general, rather than the offenses or the happiness of particular people, but it does 
include the proper method of avoiding misery and obtaining happiness.  
Theodorus endorses Socrates’ claims about the philosopher and claims that “more 
peace and less evil on earth” would ensue if everyone followed the ways of the philosophers 
(176a). I think Socrates’ response here marks a key shift in the transition away from an 
emphasis on absentminded contemplation toward a strongly ethical emphasis. However, 
Socrates’ response that it is needful to escape earth for heaven by becoming godlike could be, 
and usually is, read as a reiteration of the importance of contemplative detachment from 
earthly affairs.  After all the philosopher has been described as present in the city only in body 
and as investigating things in heaven.  
However, Socrates explains this godlikeness in terms of being just and pious and not 
in terms of contemplation and detachment. Socrates urges acting justly and virtuously. This 
exhortation is strikingly Socratic and aligns with his self-description in the Apology. Despite 
                                                 
building fund. But the mathematicians would notice nothing. [Professor] Deep would go on writing mathematics 
as before. When the lights failed because no one paid the electric bill, Deep would work by candlelight. When 
they came to take away his telephone, he would be inconvenienced only by having his research interrupted. The 
university can fall down like Jericho, but so long as the pencils and the yellow paper hold out, Deep’s work goes 
on. At least a semester would pass before he even noticed he was no longer being paid.” Jerry P. King, The Art 
of Mathematics, 237. 
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his protests of ignorance and claims that he lacks knowledge, he does claim there to know that 
“it is wicked and shameful to do wrong, to disobey one’s superior be he god or man” in 
contrast to his lack of knowledge regarding the goodness or badness of death. (Ap. 29a-b). 
And after his inconclusive discussion of death he affirms the “truth” that “a good man cannot 
be harmed either in life or in death, and that his affairs are not neglected by the gods” (Ap. 
41d). This confidence in the wisdom of virtuous action is coupled with a practice of 
reproaching those who do not practice the virtues (Ap. 29d-e, 30a, 31a).  The exhortation to 
virtuous practice in the digression is not then inconsistent with Socratic practice. It is not as if 
Socrates cares only about dialectically exposing his fellow-citizens' lack of understanding of 
virtue. He is willing to claim enough knowledge to exhort them to a certain kind of behavior 
and to assure them that so acting is indeed for the best. 
The digression’s linkage of virtue to piety and even to respect for deity also fits the 
Socrates of the Apology. He cites piety right alongside justice as one of his fundamental 
commitments. He asks the jury not to think it fitting for him to act in a way not “good or just 
or pious.” He claims to believe in the gods as “none of his accusers do” as evidenced in part 
by the fact that he has regard for the sacredness of oaths (Ap. 35d). And he can state that his 
“whole concern is not to anything unjust or impious” (Ap. 32d). 
Since the digression ends with this exhortation to pursue justice rather than pursuing 
the court techniques men employ when they simply try to obtain whatever seems best to them 
at the moment, the primary takeaway from the digression is an advocacy of a Socratic ethic. 
This is vintage Socrates familiar from the latter part of both the Gorgias and the Apology.  
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One further indicator that the primary takeaway from the digression concerns Socratic 
ethics rather than detached contemplation comes from considering what part of the 
philosophers’ ignorance Socrates chooses to highlight. He focuses on ignorance concerning 
how to navigate a society built around status and flattery. While their ignorance of what is 
nearby would seem to entail that they don’t know anything about the virtue of their neighbors, 
this is not what Socrates stresses. Rather he says that they don’t know the things necessary for 
flattery and don’t know the ways of the court—that is they don’t know the things necessary 
for playing the game that the men of the courts play.  
2.3.4 Socrates’ Affinities with the Philosophers 
However, this does not change the fact that the philosophers are described in ways that 
do not fit Socrates’ life or description of his mission. What the shift does indicate is that 
Socrates sees some sort of continuity between the two contrasts. He transitions smoothly 
between contrasting philosophers and litigious men and contrasting justice and piety with 
unjust and blasphemous conduct.  He sees continuity between a concern for careful 
understanding and a concern for acting justly and between an impatience with theoretical 
investigation and a willingness to disregard justice.  Socrates’ description of the absent-
minded philosophers clearly involves sympathy. So we are left with the task of explaining 
their affinities with Socrates.  
The most obvious continuity between the philosophers (in their extreme portrayal at 
the beginning of the digression) and Socrates is their common disdain for politics as practiced, 
but their reasons are on the surface quite different: commitment to virtue versus obliviousness 
to things at their feet. And indeed, once can scarcely exercise virtue while ignoring what is at 
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his feet. But their reasons do partly coincide. In this final section, I will briefly look at a few 
ways in which Socrates shares motivations and concerns with the philosophers.  
Socrates and the philosophers both appreciate the vanity of many social concerns. As 
noted earlier. Socrates focuses on the philosopher’s ignorance of the things that play such a 
significant role in the lives of those who are concerned with status, wealth, and power.  
These philosophers also share Socrates' concern with knowledge and expertise even if 
the things they are most interested in knowing are different. Socrates’ interest is ethical; theirs 
seems to be more physical and mathematical. However, like them Socrates thinks it important 
to have an abstract grasp on the nature of things rather than to content oneself with a list of 
instances. The philosopher’s question “What is Man?” (174b), which leads him to ignore his 
next door neighbor, has the same concern for general understanding as Socrates' questions 
about virtue or piety. Socrates puts more emphasis on recognizing instances of the general 
properties, since he is intent on not acting unjustly or impiously. Still, the philosopher’s 
interest in truth and understanding represents a wider perspective and the ability to question 
what seems good or attractive to one at the moment. And the philosophers are unlikely to 
equate seeming true or good with being true or good. This should make them more receptive 
to Socrates’ ethical exhortations to actually be just. Whether intense intellectual concerns 
actually have this effect is, of course, a large question. 
The final point of overlap between Socrates and the philosophers, their rejection of the 
political affairs of the city, also brings us to one of the main differences between them. The 
philosophers disdain ruling as analogous to stock farming: the ruler or keeper goes through 
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the hassles of management simply for the sake of the material gain he can get for it (174d-e). 
This compares to Socrates’ critique of orators and politicians in the Gorgias where his 
interlocutors praise the practice of oratory and politics as means to getting whatever one 
happens to think best. However, unlike the philosophers, he does have a vision for proper 
engagement in politics. In the Apology (31b-33b) Socrates says that he does not engage in the 
affair of the assembly, since his divine sign prevents him because fighting for justice in that 
arena would not allow him to live long. Rather he approaches particular people as “a father or 
an older brother” in order to persuade them “to care for virtue”. Thus though, unlike the 
philosophers, he takes care for his neighbors, he still avoids public affairs. This concern for 
particular other people to become just, is perhaps the biggest difference between Socrates and 
the philosophers. And we may note that the final section of the digression ends with Socrates 
explaining to Theodorus –a mathematician—why it is important to “escape from wickedness 
and pursue virtue” (176b). It is not hard to imagine that Theodorus and other would be 
philosophers are less enthused about the hard work of escaping wickedness than about 
contemplation and thus need Socrates’ reminder. 
2.4 Conclusion 
My responses to both sources of worry about the digression take the same basic form. 
The digression is a digression from the question of the nature of knowledge, but it is not an 
irrelevant one and does much to illuminate what all is involved in the main question. The 
philosophers do differ from Socrates in an important way, but Socrates exploits their 
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important resemblances to him in order to make his exhortation against the injustice of those 
who practice politics in accordance with Protagorean epistemology.  
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3 Why Care about what We Owe Others? A Critique of Scanlon’s 
Account of Moral Motivation 
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ABSTRACT: I analyze and critique Thomas Scanlon’s account of moral motivation as 
fundamentally consisting in the reasons we have to live life in a relation of “mutual 
recognition” with other people. I argue that the reasons to live in such a relation to others 
cannot account for the full rational force of morality, and, more particularly, that they cannot 
explain what is distinctively wrong with someone not concerned with morality. I conclude by 
noting ways in which Scanlon’s account could be improved by explaining moral motivation in 
terms of the value of persons. 
3.1 Introduction 
As part of his defense of his contractualist moral theory, Thomas Scanlon develops an 
account of moral motivation. This account is supposed to elucidate both the priority of moral 
obligations—the overriding role that they play within an agent’s practical reasoning—and the 
importance of moral obligations—the distinctive badness involved in an agent’s not being 
properly responsive to them. He wants to show that contractualism gives a particularly good 
explanation for both aspects of the distinctive rational force of moral judgments. I examine 
the way that Scanlon accounts for and characterizes moral motivation. I conclude that the 
central grounding he offers for moral motivation, the relation of mutual recognition, does not 
offer an adequate explanation for specifically moral motivation. It is not clear that it can 
account for the force of moral obligations and even less clear that it can give the right kind of 
explanation to fully characterize them as moral reasons for action. A direct appeal to the value 
of persons (which some passages in the book suggest anyhow) would provide Scanlon a better 
basis for explaining moral motivation than his appeal to the value of being in a certain relation 
to persons. 
Scanlon contends that a satisfactory explanation of priority and importance must avoid 
both horns of what he terms “Prichard’s dilemma.” Scanlon uses these three notions to 
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explain why he thinks contractualism yields a particularly good account of moral motivation. 
Priority and importance are criteria for showing that his account gives a strong enough basis 
to show why moral judgments are rationally compelling and why failing to heed them is a 
particularly serious fault. Prichard’s dilemma identifies two ways in which an account of 
moral motivation can fail to give the right kind of explanation for this rational force. An 
adequate account of moral motivation should give an explanation of priority and importance 
that avoids both horns of this putative dilemma. Scanlon gives these three notions a key role 
in his defense of a contractualist understanding of morality, and I will use them both as 
expository tools to present the relevant features of his account and as a way to frame my 
worries about that account. 
In speaking of moral motivation, Scanlon is concerned with the “reason-giving and 
motivating force of judgments of right and wrong.”68 He closely connects moral motivation to 
reasons for action since he holds that once an agent understands the relevant reasons “there is 
no separate problem of motivation.”69 Understanding moral motivation is not simply about 
understanding how morally good agents are in fact motivated and what they take to be 
reasons. It also concerns the justification for giving moral considerations that role in 
deliberation. He is not, however, attempting to explain moral motivation in a way that would 
vindicate it to an immoralist by his own lights.70 Scanlon is concerned with not just any 
reasons to perform outward acts in accord with moral requirements, but with the motivation 
                                                 
68 Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2000), 148. 
69 Ibid., 147. 
70 Ibid., 147–148. 
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proper to moral action.71 He wants both to elucidate why properly motivated moral actions are 
rational and to characterize proper motivation for moral actions. An account of moral 
motivation should help us see why moral actions that may look foolish to an immoralist are 
not actually stupid as well as illuminating what it is to act morally as opposed to merely in 
conformity with the requirements of morality. 
The first section of this paper explains the three crucial notions of priority, importance, 
and Prichard’s dilemma. The second section presents Scanlon’s account of moral motivation 
and his explanation for why it is a good account in these three respects. The next two sections 
involve closer examination of aspects of Scanlon’s view that are particularly relevant for the 
criticisms that I will raise. Section III concerns the relationship between Scanlon’s two 
different descriptions of the rational basis for contractualist motivation: the value of mutual 
recognition and the value of persons. Section IV concerns the role that Scanlon gives to 
impersonal values in determining the content of our moral obligations. The fifth and sixth 
sections raise criticisms of the way Scanlon bases moral motivation on the value of mutual 
recognition. Section V challenges Scanlon’s claim to vindicate the priority of moral 
judgments. Section VI challenges Scanlon’s particular conception of importance and argues 
that he does not offer a sufficient explanation for importance. Section VII concludes with a 
brief discussion of the prospects for an account of moral motivation based on the value of 
persons within an overall account of morality similar to Scanlon’s account. 
                                                 
71 Ibid., 147. 
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3.2 Priority, Importance, and Prichard’s Dilemma 
Priority concerns the overriding role that moral considerations play in an agent’s 
practical reasoning. Unless the immoralists are right, the judgment that an action is morally 
wrong is normally decisive against it. This is so even when other significant considerations 
favor the action. Scanlon’s purpose is not to convince the immoralist that moral judgments 
have this priority, but rather to offer an explanation for why moral judgments rightly take 
priority.72  
In order to understand an account of priority we need to know what considerations 
have priority over others. We need to know what considerations factor into moral verdicts and 
how they factor in. If moral obligation was simply defined as whatever one should do, all 
things considered, then moral obligations would be decisive against other considerations by 
definition. On the other hand, if only a small class of considerations need to be considered in 
order to come to a moral verdict, priority is a stronger and more controversial claim. 
According to Scanlon, priority belongs to “what we owe to each other,” that is, to the class of 
reasons that concern not wronging other people. While he recognizes significant reasons for 
action that do not concern what we owe to some other agent, he insists that what we owe to 
other persons constitutes morality proper and that it is judgments of what we owe to each 
other that enjoy priority. 
While priority concerns the reason-giving force of moral considerations in relation to 
the reason-giving force of other considerations, importance concerns the distinctive badness 
                                                 
72 Ibid., 148. 
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involved in an agent who is not properly responsive to moral concerns as compared to the 
defects involved in not being properly responsive to other values. Failing to appreciate the 
aesthetic value of natural objects, for example, does not call for the same kind of response 
from others as failing to appreciate and respond appropriately to the values involved in 
morality. The latter failure “strikes us as a particularly serious fault.”73 
Scanlon thinks an adequate account of moral motivation needs to be informative and 
elucidating while still characterizing the motivation as moral in character. He uses Prichard’s 
dilemma to show some of the difficulties in giving such an account of the priority and 
importance of morality. H. A. Prichard famously argued that moral philosophy, as standardly 
conceived, rests on a mistake and that its attempt to find a justification for moral obligations 
involves an illegitimate question.74 For, moral truths are both self-evident and basic and thus 
neither need nor can be justified in terms of anything else. Scanlon sees Prichard’s conclusion 
as problematic because simply saying that an action should be avoided because it is wrong or 
violates moral values is uninformative, whereas Scanlon wants to explain the reasons not to 
do wrong. Thus Scanlon’s sees Prichard’s claim as one horn of a dilemma. Prichard supports 
this claim by arguing that any justification of moral obligations in terms of something else 
will mischaracterize moral obligations as some other kind of reason.75 This leads to the 
                                                 
73 Ibid., 148–149. 
74 H. A. Prichard, “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?,” Mind, New Series, 21, no. 81 (January 
1, 1912): 21–37. 
75 Ibid., 22–26 Specifically, Prichard argues that any attempt to justify moral obligations will have to 
appeal to some kind of goodness and that this will need to resolve into either an appeal to its benefits for the 
agent, or into an implausible consequentialism that specifies right actions as ones that bring about good 
consequences, or else the goodness will presuppose the rightness of the actions in question. 
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second horn of the dilemma. For Scanlon agrees with Prichard that explaining the reasons for 
heeding moral obligations in terms of their conduciveness to self-interest or other non-moral 
considerations is unsatisfactory since it seems to explain away their distinctiveness as moral 
judgments.76 
3.3 Scanlon’s Account: An Overview 
Scanlon offers an account of “what we owe to each other” (WWOTEO). This label 
reflects several features of his theory of moral obligations. First, he characterizes moral 
obligations as directed toward other people. For moral obligations derive from considerations 
of what it is reasonable for us to require of each other. Second, this fixes the scope of his 
account. Scanlon does not attempt to give an account of the whole of morality, but rather of a 
certain central portion of it, namely the portion of it which involves obligations to other 
persons.77  
Scanlon claims that an act is wrong “if and only if it would be disallowed by any 
principle that [people with the appropriate motivation] could not reasonably reject.” People 
with the appropriate motivation are those who are “moved to find principles for the general 
regulation of behavior that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject"78 
(Scanlon has since clarified that this is not a concession that some people might not have 
reason to act morally because they lack the appropriate motivations. This stipulation 
                                                 
76 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 149–150. 
77 It should be noted that this is not a theory-independent way of specifying the domain. Theories which 
do not view the obligation in question as to others but instead as about others need not see the group of 
obligations which Scanlon picks out as forming a distinctive class of obligations. Section V raises some worries 
about the way Scanlon treats what we owe to each other as a distinct domain from the rest of morality. 
78 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 4. 
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concerning motivation simply serves to describe the context from which reasonableness or 
unreasonableness is to be assessed.79) The idea of reasonable rejection plays a fundamental 
role. Scanlon insists that the reasonable rejection of a principle allowing a given act is not 
based on the prior fact that the act is wrong, but that rather the act is wrong because it could 
be reasonably rejected (by appropriately motivated parties). Reasonable rejectability is the 
reason it is wrong and constitutes its wrongness. Considerations of reasonable rejection also 
allow us to distinguish which actions are right and which are wrong. “Thinking about what 
could be justified to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject” is the way “we 
determine the shape of more specific moral notions such as murder or betrayal.”80 
Crucially for our purposes, Scanlon claims that considerations of what could be 
reasonably rejected are also fundamental for moral motivation. “[T]he idea that we have 
reason to avoid actions that could not be justified in this way accounts for the distinctive 
normative force of moral wrongness.”81 Scanlon’s account of moral motivation unpacks this 
fundamental claim. He endeavors to show how the reason to act in ways that cannot be 
reasonably rejected explains the priority and importance of moral judgments without violating 
the constraints of Prichard’s dilemma.82  
                                                 
79 T. M. Scanlon, “Reasons, Responsibility, and Reliance: Replies to Wallace, Dworkin, and Deigh,” 
Ethics 112, no. 3 (April 1, 2002): 519. 
80 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 5. 
81 Ibid. 
82 As noted above this reason is not based on the independent wrongness of the actions. We have reason 
to avoid these actions because they would be disallowed by the principles, rather than having reason to accept 
the principles because they exclude wrong actions. This raises the question what reasons suitably motivated 
parties can appeal to in reasonably rejecting principles, since they cannot appeal to the wrongness of actions the 
principle would permit. This question will be (partially) discussed below when considering the role of 
impersonal values in Scanlon’s theory. 
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Scanlon thinks that the way to satisfy the constraints of Prichard’s dilemma is to locate 
the motivational basis for moral behavior in an end that is clearly relevant to morality but also 
independently intelligible as a good. This kind of defense of morality avoids both treating the 
reason giving force of moral judgments as an unexplained primitive and justifying moral 
actions in terms of considerations foreign to moral motivation. Such a strategy is illustrated by 
utilitarianism. Happiness is both independently plausible as something desirable and 
intuitively connected to morality. The appeal to the greatest happiness gives non-trivial 
support for morality without making the motivation something obviously non-moral. The 
good that Scanlon appeals to is not based on aggregate welfare or happiness, but consists 
rather in an ideal of relations among persons, namely, mutual recognition. 
Scanlon explains mutual recognition and its role in his theory of moral motivation 
through an analogy between it and friendship. Specifically the analogy is supposed to help 
show how Prichard’s dilemma can be overcome. Just as we may ask: “Why be moral?”, we 
can also ask regarding our friendships: “Why be loyal?” To answer by reference only to the 
requirements of friendship seems question-begging. But appeals to (at least some kinds of) the 
benefits of friendship seem to be “the wrong kind of response.” For, one who is “‘loyal’ for 
that kind of reason would not be a good friend at all.”83 Scanlon says that the response to this 
seeming dilemma is that the relationship involved in friendship is “desirable and admirable in 
itself.” Being in this good and admirable relation involves both benefits and joys and duties, 
and friendship constitutively involves being subject to these norms of loyalty. The motivation 
                                                 
83 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 161. 
70 
 
for loyalty derives from the recognition of the goodness of friendship, and the benefits and 
joys of friendship are part of what makes up its goodness.84 Scanlon casts moral duties as 
analogous to duties of loyalty which partially constitute, not friendship, but mutual 
recognition. 
This puts the justification of morality at two levels. At the one level particular actions 
are required because certain duties come with the relation of friendship or with the relation of 
mutual recognition. To be a friend is to recognize certain situations as calling for certain 
responses. One who doesn’t recognize reasons to help friends is not a friend. Likewise, one 
who does not recognize reasons not to wrong others is not in the relation of mutual 
recognition. But there is another level of motivation. The question arises why we should care 
about being a friend or being moral (which Scanlon understands in terms of honoring the 
requirements of mutual recognition). The requirements of friendship and of mutual 
recognition have the significance they have because those relations are good and admirable 
and we can understand that we have reason to be in them. Mutual recognition “provides a 
higher-order reason to shape our process of practical thinking” in such a way that our 
decisions cannot be reasonably rejected by others.85 
One may well wonder how mutual recognition can take priority over other values, 
such as friendship, that we take to be important to a flourishing life. Scanlon uses a two part 
strategy to defuse some of these objections. On the one hand, many kinds of reasons factor 
into what can be reasonably rejected. A principle that forbade people to take friendship or 
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hobbies seriously could be reasonably rejected for that reason.86 Thus other values can shape 
the content of moral judgments, and this mitigates, though it does not eliminate, the conflict 
between moral values and other values. On the other hand, Scanlon tries to show that respect 
for morality is built into the proper response to many other values. For example, he argues 
that it is built into our concept of friendship that we value the friend not only qua friend but 
also qua person. Thus, we can’t have the relation of friendship without also having the 
relation of mutual recognition, and unlike friendship the scope of mutual recognition must 
extend to everyone.87  
Clearly, Scanlon puts a lot of motivational weight on the choice-worthiness of 
standing in the relation of mutual recognition to others. I will raise questions about its 
suitability to bear this weight later. Scanlon provides various reasons to think that we both do 
and should recognize it as an extremely significant value. He thinks that much in our moral 
lives attests that we do indeed see mutual recognition as having this kind of priority. This is 
evidenced, he thinks, in the way in which so many of our other values have sensitivity to 
morality built into them. This extends beyond friendship; just knowing that our achievements 
were based on some fundamental unfairness undercuts their luster. The desire to be in a 
relation of mutual recognition also explains why it is so tempting to deny unfairness in 
arrangements that bring us advantages we are loath to give up. Scanlon thinks that this reflects 
                                                 
86 Ibid., 160–161, 220. 
87 Ibid., 164–165 Here is a particularly vivid presentation of the argument: “There would, for example, 
be something unnerving about a ‘friend’ who would steal a kidney for you if you needed one. This is not just 
because you would feel guilty toward the person whose kidney was stolen, but because of what it implies about 
the ‘friend’s’ view of your right to your own body parts: he wouldn’t steal them, but that is only because he 
happens to like you.” 
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not just our desire to think of ourselves as upright, but also our desire to think of ourselves as 
in a reasonable relation to our fellows.88 
Scanlon also takes mutual recognition to give the right kind of explanation for the 
special importance of failing to be responsive to moral considerations. Wrongdoing involves a 
failure to recognize me and a lack of concern for whether a course of action is justifiable to 
me and others like me. Wrongdoing is more important that other failures to heed reasons and 
respect values because it has this personal character. 
 Scanlon introduces this explanation for the importance of morality by discussing 
other ways shared appreciation for values produces or enables corresponding relations. Shared 
appreciation of experiences like mountaineering or shared social causes allow us to identify 
with others. Failure to appreciate activities cuts us off from the relations formed around that 
activity, whether it be chess or birdwatching. Of course it is not crucial or important that we 
are involved in any particular relation sustained by such particular values, but Scanlon thinks 
that when we are cut off from the relation of mutual recognition with others we fail to 
appreciate the value of people themselves. While someone who simply “cannot share our 
enthusiasm for one or another valuable pursuit can still be a good neighbor, co-worker, or 
even friend,” failure to appreciate moral reasons “makes a more fundamental difference” 
since the person does not “see why the justifiability of his or her actions to us should be of 
any importance.”89 
                                                 
88 Ibid., 163–164. 
89 Ibid., 159. 
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Scanlon argues that the interpersonal content of the ideal of relations explains the 
special importance of right and wrong as reasons which it is particularly serious to fail to 
appreciate. Someone’s not being responsive to this ideal amounts to their not caring whether 
their actions are justifiable to me or to my fellows. Scanlon claims this amounts to a denial of 
our status as persons, so mutual recognition is essential to being in the relation created by the 
shared value of persons. Another’s failure to be in this relation is more important than failure 
to be in the relation created by the shared appreciation of glaciers or mathematics because I 
am an instantiation of the value that is not being appreciated. The emphasis is on the 
fundamental importance we attach to others exercising regard for justifiability to us and other 
people.90 
In explaining priority, importance, and how to avoid Prichard’s dilemma Scanlon 
leans heavily on the appeal of mutual recognition. The criticisms I raise against his account 
are primarily based on the role that he gives to mutual recognition. But Scanlon does also 
speak of the value of persons as an alternate description of what we are responding to in 
acting morally. Furthermore, he discusses the significance of impersonal values for ethics in 
general and for WWOTEO in particular, and these values are not dependent on the value of 
mutual recognition. It is important to look more closely at how the value of persons and 
impersonal values relate to mutual recognition in Scanlon’s overall account. 
                                                 
90 It is not entirely clear what the fact that the wrongdoer does not care about justifiability to others 
adds. As the passage about the kidney stealing “friend” quoted in note 87 indicates, moral violations against 
other persons disturb us because they indicate that the wrongdoer does not value us qua persons. 
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3.4 The Value of Persons versus the Value of Mutual Recognition 
Scanlon argues that the contractualist formula specifies what properly responding to 
the value of persons comes to. But it is not clear what the relationship is between the value of 
persons and value of mutual recognition. If the proper response to the value of persons is to 
treat them in accordance with WWOTEO, why do we need to bring in the appeal to standing 
in a certain relation to them? Does the fact that people are valuable in such a way as to call for 
recognizing them explain the reasons we have to find mutual recognition good and admirable? 
Or, does the value of mutual recognition instead explain the value of persons? These 
questions are important for understanding Scanlon’s theory and its prospects for accounting 
for the distinctive rational force of moral judgments. 
The value of persons interpretation of moral motivation is tied to a major theme in 
Scanlon. He devotes significant space to exploring the structure of values.91 He argues that the 
proper response to value is not always promoting the existence of valuable things or trying to 
bring about states of affairs in which the value obtains. Rather different values call for 
different sorts of responses. Maximizing the number of people in existence is not the 
appropriate response to the value of persons. Scanlon thinks we respect the value of persons 
by acknowledging “their status as self-governing beings.”92 And we do this by acting only in 
ways sanctioned by principles they could not reasonably reject. By following such principles 
we give them what we owe them. 
                                                 
91 See especially chapter 2. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 78–107. 
92 Ibid., 183. 
75 
 
The value of persons interpretation is also implied by the way Scanlon frames the 
question of duties to animals. He takes it to be clear that there are reasons to avoid causing 
animals pain. What he thinks less clear is whether we owe it to animals not to mistreat them, 
that is, whether mistreating them is wrong in such a way that “we should feel guilty to the 
animal itself.”93 Plants and many other natural objects provide a clear example of impersonal 
values where the implications for our behavior are not explained by duties to the object but by 
the “character of these objects—such as their grandeur, beauty, and complexity.” We need not 
acknowledge plants as “self-governing beings,” as we do people. The question is whether 
animals call for such acknowledgement. 94 This way of putting the question emphasizes the 
value of the thing being responded to—be it plant, animal, or person—rather than 
emphasizing that it is good for the one responding to the value to be in a certain relation with 
the thing valued. This indicates that Scanlon could and perhaps sometimes does think of 
duties to other persons as based on their value, rather than on the value of being in the relation 
of mutual recognition.  
However, whatever the relation between the value of persons and the value of mutual 
recognition, Scanlon explains the rational motivational basis for acting morally in terms of the 
good of mutual recognition. As we saw in the previous section, the substantive good he 
appeals to is not people but a relation with people, and it is this that underwrites his analogy 
with friendship and his explanations of priority and importance. Perhaps they could equally be 
justified in terms of the value of persons, but that is not the justification he gives. After 
                                                 
93 Ibid., 182. 
94 Ibid., 183. 
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examining Scanlon’s treatment of impersonal values in the next section. I will be able to say a 
bit more about how the value of persons relates to the value of mutual recognition. 
3.5 Impersonal Values 
The fact that Scanlon acknowledges significant classes of reasons for action that are 
not based on what we owe to other persons complicates his account. Understanding how he 
treats “impersonal values” is crucial for understanding what precisely his claims about the 
priority and importance of moral obligations come to. The way he handles impersonal values 
is also important for the criticism I will raise. Animal pain is an example of an impersonal 
value worth taking seriously in various ways. As we saw, it is a bad thing that we have 
reasons not to cause, quite independently of the question whether we owe anything to the 
animal itself. Scanlon defines “impersonal grounds” as “reasons that are not tied to the well-
being, claims, or status of individuals in any particular position.”95 This is a broad category 
that includes the beauty of nature and of art, the values responded to by efforts at conservation 
and preservation of nature, and, presumably, such things as the intrinsic value of 
understanding mathematics. Although these values contribute to the well-being of individuals 
and affect what claims one can make on others, Scanlon explicitly denies that impersonal 
values can “themselves, provide grounds for reasonably rejecting a principle.”96 
How then do these impersonal values relate to the reason we have to act in ways 
justifiable to others? Scanlon admits that there are other values which are moral in a broader 
sense and that contractualism explains only part of the moral domain, albeit a very central 
                                                 
95 Ibid., 219. 
96 Ibid., 220. 
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part. In many cases impersonal values will simply impose requirements on us that are 
additional to what we owe to each other.97 I should not act in ways that show contempt for 
beautiful things for reasons that go beyond any obligations I might have to other persons not 
to scorn their work or ruin their chance to appreciate them. Still, we need some accounting of 
how the various domains of morality fit together, whether their verdicts can conflict, and how 
those conflicts are to be resolved.  
Scanlon’s admission that impersonal reasons “play a significant role in determining 
other grounds for reasonable rejection” partially addresses this tension.98 Impersonal values 
can provide one with a reason to reject principles that would keep one from recognizing the 
impersonal value. A principle that does not allow me to respect the aesthetical and ecological 
value of a grand old tree might be reasonably rejectable not because of the value of the tree, 
but because of the importance for me of respecting that value. Scanlon also argues that proper 
valuation of the tree has (some) accommodations for the rights of people built into it. For the 
most part respecting the value of the tree will not call for violating what I owe to others. This 
is both because what I owe to others is sensitive to my reasons for wanting to respect the 
value of the tree, and because proper respect for the tree is sensitive to such things as the 
rights of others (it would hardly require me to enslave them as caretakers of the tree, for 
example).99 
                                                 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
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Still, conflicts are likely to arise. As Scanlon himself puts it, there “may be cases 
where we have to choose between impersonal values and what we owe to each other.”100 We 
might wonder why Scanlon needs to make this admission. After all he thinks that in many 
cases my need to respect impersonal values explains why I could reasonably reject principles 
that kept me from honoring them. And he also thinks that the proper respect for impersonal 
values is often compatible with giving priority to the rights of persons. So why is there room 
for a gap that results in the necessity of choosing between them? The fact that there could be a 
conflict shows that Scanlon does not think of WWOTEO as (at least not by definition) an all 
things considered judgment about what one should do. 
The possibility of a gap may also indicate something about the way Scanlon 
understands the relationship between mutual recognition and the value of persons. Scanlon’s 
analogy between friendship and mutual recognition offers an explanation for why there can be 
a conflict between what we owe to each other and impersonal values. The motivation for 
loyalty to friends comes from the good of being in the friendship relation. Friendship's 
requirements are sensitive to values outside of friendship. A good friend will not resent the 
loss of some time that was to be spent together if his friend has strong enough reason to 
pursue some conflicting course of action. But there can come times when pursuing other 
values must lead to the end of a friendship. Perhaps one simply can’t pursue both. It need not 
be a moral problem to sacrifice a friendship (by neglecting interaction, not by betrayal) since 
on Scanlon’s construal the rational motivation for friendship comes from the appeal and 
                                                 
100 Ibid., 223. 
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admirableness of the relationship rather than from friendship being the appropriate response 
to the value of the other. If moral motivation parallels this, then there is the intelligible 
possibility of scenarios where one could correctly choose other values over the good of 
mutual recognition. If on the other hand the rational basis for morality were based 
fundamentally on proper response to the value of persons, then plausibly at least what we owe 
to others would be specified by an all things considered judgment that by definition takes 
fully into account the rational force of impersonal values. Following a rational all things 
considered judgment would necessarily fulfill what we owe to others because by definition 
the judgment was based on deliberation that gave a proper role to the value of other persons. 
3.6 Criticism: Wrong Account of Priority  
3.6.1 Two Worries 
I want to press two central worries about the way in which Scanlon attempts to 
vindicate the priority of moral judgments. The first is that the ideal of mutual recognition 
cannot bear the weight he wants it to carry unless it is reinforced by some deeper value. 
Perhaps mutual recognition could bear this weight if its value were understood as dependent 
on and less fundamental than the value of persons. The second worry I will press is that 
WWOTEO is too narrow a segment of morality to have priority over all other values. 
3.6.2 Limitations of the Value of Mutual Recognition 
If the weight of moral motivation is to be hung on the value of mutual recognition, 
then the fact that mutual recognition is only an ideal becomes worrisome. Acting morally 
often only involves acting in such a way that one’s own conduct is suitable for mutual 
recognition, not the actual achievement of mutual recognition. To be sure, there could be 
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justifications given which explain why acting in accord with mutual recognition is important 
even when it does not produce actual mutual recognition. There could well be reasons why it 
is important that we operate in a way that is open to that relation, and even reasons to act in 
accordance with it when others do not. But these would have to involve reasons other than the 
good for me of being in the relation. 
 Scanlon uses friendship as an analogy to illuminate how a certain relation which 
involves duties and sacrifices can be seen as a good and admirable relation to be in. But it is 
not clear how an ideal of friendship with someone which I have strong reason to think 
unrealizable is going to provide me with the motivation to keep up the duties of loyalty. It 
takes more than a realization of the goodness which an actual, if imperfect, friendship would 
involve to reassure me when I think of abandoning my one-sided loyalty. Obviously, 
friendships often are in place, and a real, if imperfect, mutual recognition may also often be in 
place. But, just as an ideal of friendship with someone who is not my friend has limited 
motivational power to make me act loyally, so the mere fact that mutual recognition would 
represent the best kind of relation among people scarcely explains why acting morally takes 
priority over other values. Scanlon allows that sometimes we may need to choose between 
actual ties to those around us and the ideal of mutual recognition (perhaps if the values of 
those around us clash with properly recognizing outsiders).101 If the reasons to act in accord 
with mutual recognition only come from the goodness for me of being in the relation of 
                                                 
101 Ibid., 166. 
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mutual recognition, then it is not clear why morality should take priority over these actual 
bonds with others. 
Thus it seems more promising to derive priority from the fact that there is reason to 
respect people and that respecting people is constituted by treating them morally (which for 
Scanlon, of course, involves treating them according to principles which they cannot 
reasonably reject). If we can elucidate why people have an especially important value, then 
we could elucidate why properly valuing them is especially important and properly takes 
priority over other values. We might expect that the value of persons would also explain the 
special goodness we get in living in the right relation to them. Being in a right relation to a 
special value could result in a special goodness in our lives.  
Treating the value of persons as fundamental may also make better sense of the 
reasons involved in duties both of morality and of loyalty in friendships.102 Talbot Brewer 
argues that the reasons provided by the fact of my friendship with someone are not “basic, 
non-derivative” reasons. For, friendship involves assigning a high value to the friend’s “health 
and happiness.” This value, he thinks, must be prior to the friendship, for forming a friendship 
involves gaining “a deep appreciation for something whose value predates ones arrival on the 
                                                 
102 Scanlon’s attempt to derive motivation for loyalty from the goodness of the relation of friendship 
seems less implausible than his attempt to derive motivation for moral duties from the goodness of mutual 
recognition. For while moral duties are owed to everyone, we are friends to only a few and we exercise some 
choice as to who are friends are. This fact could be used to call into question the analogy that Scanlon draws 
between friendship and mutual recognition. However, I am more sympathetic to Brewer’s argument that even in 
friendships the goodness of the friend is more explanatorily fundamental than the goodness of the relation of 
friendship. 
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scene.” Friendship put us in a position to appreciate the value of a friend, which value we 
might otherwise have missed.103  
Jay Wallace raises a related worry about Scanlon’s attempt to explain moral 
obligations in terms of the appeal of mutual recognition. He notes that the appeal to mutual 
recognition attempts to show the “contribution that morality can make to the meaning and 
goodness of the agent’s own life.”104 However, this is not the “particularly modality of the 
good” that agents “structure their practical thinking around.” Rather, the motivation and 
rationale for avoiding wrong actions is the particular qualities that make them wrong such as 
their hurtfulness or cruelty. Wallace is not satisfied with Scanlon’s explanation that mutual 
recognition provides us with a higher order reason to shape our thinking so that we take those 
particular considerations to be significant. He thinks that this yields a false consciousness akin 
to that found in forms of indirect consequentialism which appeal to a consequentialist basis in 
order to recommend non-consequentialist habits of thought and motivation.105 Wallace 
suggests an alternate strategy for appealing to mutual recognition. We should think of the 
ideal of mutual recognition as having two aspects. The one aspect is other-oriented, focusing 
us outward on what other people could reasonably reject. We can see avoiding these actions 
as responding to their value as persons. However, when questions of priority arise the second, 
self-directed aspect, which emphasizes mutual recognition’s contribution to our own life, is 
                                                 
103 Talbot Brewer, The Retrieval of Ethics (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 260 
Brewer’s conception of friendship as both a response to the value of others and an enabler of proper appreciation 
for their value appears at various places in the book. 
104 R. Jay Wallace, “Scanlon’s Contractualism,” Ethics 112, no. 3 (2002): 455. 
105 Ibid., 455–466. 
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prominent. For, then we want to know how moral considerations can “prevail rationally in 
competition with one’s defining personal projects.”106 
Perhaps such a double aspect approach could be developed in a way that elucidates 
why properly responding to the value of persons is good for the agent but does not treat the 
reasons for treating people as valuable subservient to that good. However, this is not 
Scanlon’s approach. As we saw, he is concerned to argue that his contractualism is a plausible 
way to spell out what it means to properly value persons and he thinks we have reason to 
acknowledge others as self-governing beings. But he does not give much by way of 
explanation or elucidation as to why these reasons deserve a special priority. Rather he wants 
to elucidate why we have reason to treat people respectfully and with moral consideration 
more generally by reference to an obviously attractive good, namely mutual recognition. His 
discussion of moral motivation and friendship motivation both treat the good of the relation, 
rather than the value of the one with whom we relate, as motivationally fundamental. With the 
strategy understood in this way, priority must come not from the force of the need to treat 
other people well but from the reason for me to want to be in that relation of mutual 
recognition.  
My objection in short is that the value of mutual recognition is not able to explain the 
distinctive rational significance of moral judgments without appeal to the value of persons.107 
But, granting for the sake of argument that Scanlon is right that WWOTEO is the proper 
                                                 
106 Ibid., 456–457. 
107 Not that the Value of Persons is the only possible explanation for the significance of mutual 
recognition, but it is the one that is in play in Scanlon. 
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response to the value of persons, we are still left without an explanation of why the value of 
persons is significant in relation to other values. Scanlon attempts to answer that question by 
reference to the goodness and attractiveness of mutual recognition—that is by treating the 
value of mutual recognition as fundamental for moral motivation. But that brings us back to 
the worries already raised. 
3.6.3 Priority and the Limited Domain of Contractualism  
When we speak of the priority of moral judgments over other values, we may think 
most naturally of those values which are often categorized as self-interested. In that case a 
defense of priority would take the form of showing why we have sufficient (and compelling) 
reason to limit the pursuit of self-interest in the relevant ways. But given the way that Scanlon 
carves the moral domain, we also need an account of why WWOTEO has priority over 
impersonal values not readily categorized as self-interested. Many of these values fall under 
what Scanlon calls the broader use of the term ‘morality.’ 
Scanlon does not object to this more expansive use of moral language. But he does 
insist that WWOTEO is the central part of morality and suggests that it is the morality of right 
and wrong in the strict sense.108 Further he explicates the priority of morality in terms of 
WWOTEO. It is the claims of WWOTEO that have priority over other claims. This raises two 
potential worries. For one, we might think that morality more broadly construed has priority 
as well and that a proper explanation of priority should cover morality more broadly, or at 
least naturally generalize to cover it. For another, we might wonder if the priority of each is 
                                                 
108 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 171–173. 
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compatible with that of the other. As we saw Scanlon goes to some length to show that there 
is substantial harmony between WWOTEO and other important values such as friendship. 
But, as we saw at the end of section IV he admits the possibility of conflict where we must 
“choose” between the two. One response to this admission would be to insist that moral 
verdicts must be all things considered verdicts that take into account both WWOTEO and the 
other values in question and that only these verdicts can properly be said to have priority. 
But this would require significant remodeling of Scanlon’s picture of priority and of 
the fragmentation of the moral. For, as noted before, an interesting notion of priority must 
include the claim that there are certain considerations that do not need to be taken into 
account in the process of figuring out what one has most reason to do. The set of 
considerations that has priority is the set that must be taken account of in order to reach a 
moral verdict. According to the suggestion under consideration one would have to take more 
than WWOTEO into account to reach a moral verdict.109 
3.7 Criticism: Wrong Account of Importance 
My second criticism is that Scanlon’s account mischaracterizes importance. Since he 
characterizes importance in terms of my response to the fact that others do not properly 
recognize me, and emphasizes this first person response, it is quite unclear how this notion of 
importance could be extended to cover responses to violations of impersonal values that don’t 
include disregard for me. But Scanlon’s characterization of importance is problematic even 
for the domain of what we owe to each other. 
                                                 
109 Which is to be distinguished from the way in which Scanlon allows that certain impersonal values 
can figure indirectly into what is the verdict of WWOTEO. 
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I find Scanlon’s appeal to the fact that I am the value which the wrongdoer fails to 
appreciate unsatisfying. Why does the fact that it is I who am not appreciated (rather than, 
say, the Grand Canyon) explain why the failure of the person in question is so much more 
important? Clearly I am more intimately affected by how I am treated, but this in itself is not 
relevant for assessing the other person. Scanlon’s discussion suggests more than this, for he 
immediately points out that this failure of appreciation extends to everyone: “the amoralist 
does not think that anyone is owed the consideration that morality describes just in virtue of 
being a person.” However, while we care about how agents treat persons in general, Scanlon’s 
explanation for why we find that particularly important concerns “the person’s attitude toward 
us.” Failure to give moral consideration to others, who are also persons, reveals their lack of 
concern for “the justifiability of his or her actions to us,” and this is what Scanlon stresses. 
Thus, the basic claim seems to be, not that I am the kind of thing it is particularly 
reprehensible not to respond appropriately to, but rather that I have particularly strong reason 
to care about how you respond to this kind of value since I am one of the entities that 
instantiate it. It is not that I have a particularly strong reason to care because what you did is 
particularly bad, but rather because I am the thing whose value you do not appreciate.110 
Scanlon describes importance in terms of the significance for third parties of 
someone’s failure to give proper response to moral considerations.111 But his explanation 
locates the problem at the wrong place. He doesn’t explain what is particularly bad about the 
                                                 
110 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 158–160. 
111 Ibid., 149 Given the discussion above, it might be as apt to say the significance for second parties, 
that is the parties affronted by the moral violation. 
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failure viewed simply as a failure of the agent, but rather explains why it is particularly 
distressing for others.  
While it is true that insensitivity to moral considerations does give more reason for 
distress to third parties than many other failures to appreciate reasons, the failure is important 
in a way that goes beyond that. The wrongdoer has a particularly serious badness or defect, “it 
is a particularly serious failing.” The simple fact that he does not recognize me cannot be 
enough. A bear doesn’t recognize me either, and this can be quite inconvenient. But the bear’s 
actions are not wrongdoing and are not morally important. Presumably this is because the bear 
doesn’t really have the kind of fault or “failing” involved in humans who don’t recognize me, 
because there are not reasons applicable to him that he is disregarding. 
The importance of a moral violation presupposes the priority of the moral 
consideration involved, or at least that it takes priority in that particular situation. If a human 
who did not recognize me did not it fact have compelling reasons to recognize me this would 
not be a rational fault of hers. This suggests that vindicating priority is crucial for vindicating 
importance. If the wrongdoer is not failing to heed a consideration that has rational priority 
over the other considerations in play, then he cannot be committing an important rational 
failure, for he is not committing a rational failure at all. Thus, if Scanlon’s account does not 
give an adequate explanation of priority, neither can it give an adequate explanation of 
importance.  
It might be thought that the importance for others need not presuppose that it is a 
genuine rational failing on the part of the wrongdoer. Perhaps whatever it is the makes the 
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wrongdoing important in other’s eyes only gives some and not decisive reason not to do the 
wrong in question (importance without priority). Or more radically, one might think that 
whatever makes the wrongdoing important for others need not indicate any reason for the 
agent himself to avoid it. Perhaps enmity works this way. There might be no conflict between 
judging that the other has good reason to be an enemy to us and hating him because he is our 
enemy. One might hate the enemy for the bad things he does to one and still think that these 
acts of animosity are what his enemy has reason to do. One’s anger or applause at a killing 
may depend on whether the slain was enemy or friend. But moral evaluation, which leads to 
indignation or the lack thereof, is not determined by one’s standpoint toward the slayer and 
the slain, but rather on whether the slayer should have done what he did. In this sense, at least, 
moral evaluation is impartial: it depends on the reasons for and against the action and does not 
vary with the evaluator’s relation to the actor, the action, or the action’s effects. If, then, 
Scanlon’s explanation of importance is based simply on the value of being in a certain relation 
to others and the disvalue of them not treating us in accord with that relation (valuing us qua 
persons, which means valuing all persons), that is a strike against his explanation. An 
explanation based on the rational mistake of the wrongdoer in not properly responding to the 
value of persons would be more promising. 
3.8 Conclusion: 
The worries I raise do not for the most part concern the specific content of 
contractualist morality or its general principle that we should act in ways not reasonably 
rejectable by others. Rather, the worries concern the fundamental motivational basis which 
Scanlon describes for satisfying the demands of WWOTEO. They concern both the way in 
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which his theory treats it as a distinct domain from morality more broadly and the way he 
accounts for the reasons and obligations that he does categorize in the narrower domain of 
WWOTEO.  
The worries I raise would hold significantly less force if we took the value of persons 
as fundamental for moral motivation rather than the good of mutual recognition. This might 
not require much revision of the normative principles Scanlon advocates,112 but it would 
require additional argumentation for why the value of persons is so distinctively significant. 
The account of moral motivation would then require more explanation for why the value of 
persons properly takes priority over other values, and a different argument for why it is a 
particularly serious fault in a person to be insufficiently responsive to the value of persons. 
This argument would need to appeal to more than the fact that we cannot enjoy the good of 
mutual recognition with the immoral. 
In discussing Prichard’s dilemma, Brewer articulates a strategy for philosophically 
elucidating the value of persons. He argues that Prichard’s alleged dilemma does not prove 
that moral philosophy rests on a mistake since “the value of persons that gives rise to moral 
obligations can be brought to light by fully explicating the value of many of our most 
important interactions with other people.”113 These interactions include such things as 
                                                 
112 The revision might alter the way impersonal values affect our moral obligations. If morality is about 
responding properly to the value of persons, then what we owe to them might just be the all things considered 
judgment that fully takes into account the proper response to impersonal values. This would close the door that 
Scanlon leaves open for the possibility that we would need to choose between morality (the relation of mutual 
recognition) and impersonal values (see the final paragraph of section IV of this paper). 
 
113 Brewer, The Retrieval of Ethics, 178–179. 
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friendships, “intimate loves,” engagement in conversations, and even “appreciation of the 
literature and music of others.” Whereas Scanlon takes the goodness of the relation of mutual 
recognition to vindicate moral obligations, Brewer takes the goodness of these interactions 
with others to imply certain things about the value of persons, and takes it to be this latter 
value that vindicates moral obligations. For Brewer, it is not that moral requirements derive 
their motivational force from the fact that they are partially constitutive of these valuable 
interactions; rather, the value of human beings “is implicit in our understanding of the nature 
and point of” such interactions. Thus reflection on their goodness can lead to “a clear and 
cogent apprehension” of the value of persons.114 
Brewer’s approach to elucidating the value of persons aims to bring to light the ways 
in which we already understand that persons (or, more specifically, humans) are valuable in 
ways relevant to moral obligations. This undertaking could complement attempts to show why 
persons are valuable. Such attempts are of course manifold and familiar. Appeals to dignity, 
rationality, the image of God, etc. are ways of attempting to understand what it is about 
people that makes them distinctively valuable. In one of the passages which suggest the value 
of persons interpretation of moral reasons, Scanlon even makes his own suggestion: people 
are “self-governing beings.”115 
  
                                                 
114 Ibid., 179. 
115 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 183 Discussed in section III of this paper. 
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Conclusion 
In an attempt to address the question of what can be learned from considering these 
three essays jointly, I will first explore a surface tension between the first two essays which 
both concern epistemology, and then say a bit about how to connect the themes of the third 
paper on moral obligation with what I say in reconciling the two epistemology papers.  
Briefly put the surface tension is that the first essay argues for a conceptual separation 
between epistemology and ethical virtue while the second essay defends a conceptual 
connection between epistemology and ethical virtue. The first essay argues that virtue 
reliabilist accounts of knowledge do not need to treat character virtues as potential 
“knowledge-makers” since the telos of character virtues, even those concerning intellectual 
conduct, is not what it needs to be for an account of knowledge. The second essay argues that 
Socrates’ description of two upbringings and lifestyles and exhortation to virtuous living is 
not a departure from the attempt to analyze knowledge. 
One line of response is to note that the passage discussed in the second paper 
explicitly concerns wisdom rather than all knowledge. It is because the digression concerns 
wisdom that the epistemology connects so closely to ethics. One’s conception of wisdom will 
be manifested in one’s ethic. Thus it might be a more promising strategy in the case of 
reliabilism to focus on reliabilist accounts of wisdom, if one wanted to show that reliabilist 
epistemologists should pay attention to character virtues in their accounts of knowledge. 
Perhaps it is focusing on the special kind of knowledge that is wisdom that is needed to bring 
out a conceptual connection between knowledge and virtue of character. 
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However, I do not think that this would suffice to draw the closer conceptual 
connection between virtues of intellectual character and an account of knowledge. This is 
because contemporary epistemologists have a different view of what is being analyzed in 
analyzing knowledge than Plato does. The chief concern of contemporary epistemology is 
knowing that something is the case, knowing that a claim is true. For them the knowledge of 
important things does not differ from knowledge of trivialities in its being knowledge, but 
only its being important. On this conception of knowledge knowing the answer to a question 
about how I should live my life or about the nature of God is no higher on the scale of being 
knowledge than knowing how many points a given basketball player scored on January 17, 
1976. The first propositions are more important knowledge of course, but not superior qua 
being knowledge. For Plato on the other hand knowledge is paradigmatically of objects 
(especially the forms) and not of propositions. Knowing the form of the good is more 
important because it is more knowable and more real than other things. One can of course 
know in a qualified sense other things, even quite trivial things such as a doghouse if one 
understands the dog house quite well. But to know in the fully unqualified sense one must 
know reality in general not just parts of it. In particular one must know moral and ethical 
reality. So epistemological accounts that are wrong about reality in general will go hand in 
hand with correspondingly flawed ethics.  
This feature of Plato’s epistemology provides another way of framing my critique of 
Scanlon’s account of moral motivation and moral obligation. Scanlon argues that moral 
motivation derives from the reasons we have to be in a certain relation to other people. He 
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gives the value of the relation decisive significance rather the value of the persons to whom 
we stand in the relation. Further, he seeks to isolate moral obligation as a distinct domain 
from other parts of ethics that involve responding to various other values. His explanation for 
why moral obligation has distinctive priority and importance rests on its peculiar relation to us 
and its effect on our lives. It does not rest on the claim that if we truly saw the world right, 
and thus had knowledge in the fullest sense, we would know that being virtuous is of supreme 
importance. Plato is committed to this claim and so can see real knowledge as leading to real 
virtue. 
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